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ABSTRACT  
Tax treaties have a developed language of their own within the field of international law. They may 
include terms that are unknown in particular jurisdictions of domestic law or therein defined differently. 
Because the language of tax treaties and domestic law differ from each other, the definitions of 
certain terms and income type under a tax treaty and under different states’ domestic law are not 
necessary identical. Despite these differences, tax treaty definitions must be used for tax treaty 
classification purposes, and domestic law definitions must be used for domestic law classification 
purposes. The tax definition determines the type of the income for tax treaty purposes even though 
the income would qualify under another income category under the treaty states’ domestic law. 
Similarly, the domestic tax law definition determines the type of income for domestic law purposes 
(Helminen 2010). In most instances the treaty definitions of the various types of income refer back to 
domestic tax law, and where the domestic tax law definition deviates between the two treaty 
countries, this may lead to the application by these countries of different articles of the treaty. If this is 
caused by the application of the domestic law, this is referred to as a conflict of qualification in the 
Commentaries to the OECD Model Tax Convention. In general a conflict of qualification refers to a 
situation where identical facts are treated differently for tax purposes in different countries. Such a 
conflict may either concern the subject or the object of taxation. 
 
Key words: Tax treaties, OECD MTC, Double Tax Agreements, double taxation, conflicts of 
qualification, hybrid entities, partnerships, fiscally transparent, domestic law, Mutual Agreement 
Procedures, permanent establishment.  
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Double taxation agreement (DTA): is an international treaty concluded between two states to 
determine the incidence of tax in, and the application of tax laws by, each state with the object of 
avoiding double taxation (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
Economic double taxation: is a situation where income or capital is taxed in two or more states 
during the same period in respect of the same transaction, but usually in the hands of different 
taxpayers (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
Fiscally transparent: "Looking through" an entity and attributing profits and losses directly to the 
entity's members. The profits of certain forms of enterprises are taxed in the hands of the members 
rather than at the level of the enterprise. Often occurs in the case of a partnership for example 
(OECD) 
Hybrid entity: entity that is characterized differently in two or more jurisdictions, for example, an 
entity that is treated as a partnership in one jurisdiction and as a corporation in another (OECD). 
International Tax Group: these are the founders of the theory contained in the OECD Commentary 
on to resolve qualification conflicts (Potgens 2012). 
Juridical double taxation: a situation where income or capital is taxed in the hands of the same 
taxpayer more than once, whether by a way of different taxes or, in an international context, by 
different taxing authorities (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
Model Tax Convention (MTC): A model tax treaty is designed to streamline and achieve uniformity in 
the allocation of taxing right between countries in cross-border situations. Model tax treaties 
developed by OECD and UN are widely used and a number of countries have their own model 
treaties (OECD). 
Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAP): a means through which tax administrations consult to 
resolve disputes regarding the application of double tax conventions.  This procedure described and 
authorized by Article 25 of the OECD MTC, can be used to eliminate double taxation that could arise 
from a transfer pricing adjustment (OECD). 
OECD: The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) is a multilateral 
organization comprised of 30 countries, which are mostly Western European countries and other 
industrialized countries including US and Japan. Founded in 1961, the OECD provides a forum for 
representatives of countries to discuss and attempt to coordinate economic and social policies. It has 
an especially significant role in international tax matters. Its website is www.oecd.org. 
Permanent establishment (PE): a tax treaty concept used to determine when an enterprise has 
sufficient connection with a country to subject it to tax on its income attributable to a PE, often 
incorporated into domestic law (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
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NOTES 
Commentary cited in this study refers to the OECD Commentary to Article 23 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, unless stated otherwise.  
The following expressions ‘double tax agreement’, ‘double tax treaty’, ‘double tax convention’ 
and ‘tax treaty’ are used interchangeably in this study, but all refer to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, unless stated otherwise.   
It should be noted that that the expression ‘double taxation’ when used in this research refers to 
international juridical double taxation as opposed to economic double taxation, unless stated 
otherwise.  
Article 23A and 23B are jointly referred to as Article 23 in this study.  
Article 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD MTC deals with the taxation of cross-border dividends, interest and 
royalties respectively.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
1.1. Double tax agreements 
The OECD first published a Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital in 1963, 
followed by the MTC on Income and Capital in 1977. The OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) 
is accompanied by an extensive Commentary, prepared by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
Since 1992, the OECD MTC and the Commentary are updated on a regular basis (paragraphs 9-11 of 
Introduction to OECD MTC). 
A tax treaty is a contract between two or more sovereign states. One would be referred to as a source 
state, whilst the other is called the residence state. Tax treaties are international agreements forming 
part public international law. The main objective of tax treaties is avoidance of double taxation and 
prevention of fiscal evasion (Gulati 2013). Furthermore, it is their goal to create legal certainty for the 
benefit of contracting states as well as for taxpayers and to assure the equal application of tax laws in 
Contracting states (Vogel & Prokisch 1993). 
The importance of tax treaties has increased significantly in recent years as a consequence of the 
globalization of the economy and the liberalization of cross-border trade and investment. The number 
of bilateral tax treaties currently in force exceeds 2,500. The United Nations (UN) MTC, which caters 
mostly for developing countries, was revised in 2001. Despite their importance and their phenomenal 
growth in recent years, tax treaties are often criticized for their fundamental deficiencies (Arnold et al. 
2003). 
Concluding double tax agreements is a formalized way for different states to agree on a method of 
reducing or eliminating double taxation. Double taxation may occur for any of the following reasons: 
residence-residence conflict, source-resident conflict, source-source conflict and triangular conflict 
cases. With regard to triangular conflict cases, a country may have a source-residence conflict with 
one country and a source-source conflict with another country, which could trigger an incremental 
layer of unrecoverable taxes, unless some form of relief is provided. Most treaties are bilateral in 
nature and would not necessarily address triangular cases and thus one stream of income is 
potentially taxable in three different jurisdictions with double or triangular taxation as a result.  
1.2. What is conflict of qualification? 
Chapter III (Taxation of Income) and IV (Taxation of Capital) of the OECD MTC contain the operative 
treaty provisions. These provisions set forth the treaty object in respect of which treaty application is 
sought. Identifying the treaty object is of paramount importance in applying a tax treaty. First, the 
object must be identified under the domestic law of the contracting state whose tax to which the treaty 
is applied. Then the object must be identified for treaty purposes. The object, as it is identified under 
domestic law may be, but by no means necessarily, identical to the object identified for treaty 
purposes. In reality, discrepancies exist in many instances between the meaning of the term under 
the domestic laws of a contracting State and the meaning of the same term under the laws of the 
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other contracting state or under the treaty. The problem at issue is generally known as ‘qualification’. 
Qualification is a part of a larger field of treaty interpretation (Van Weeghel 1998). 
The process of qualification, in the application of a tax treaty, normally occurs twice in each instance, 
i.e. the source state will determine which treaty provision can be applied to the item of income in 
question, and the residence state will do the same. In most instances, the qualification will be the 
same in the source state and in the residence state, but in a quite a few instances the qualification in 
the source state and in the residence state may be different from each other. Van Weeghel (1998) 
introduces the concept of ‘positive qualification conflict’ as the situation where both states tax the 
same item of income as a result of the application of different provisions of the treaty. This mainly as a 
result of different interpretation of the treaty provisions between the states. ‘Positive qualification 
conflict’ therefore leads to double taxation. The reverse situation where the compensation would 
have gone untaxed in both states is referred to as a ‘negative qualification conflict’.  Lang (2009) 
further explains ‘negative conflict of qualification’ as cases where, due to differences in the domestic 
law between the state of source and the state of residence, the former applies, with respect to a 
particular item of income or capital, provisions of the tax treaty that are different from those that the 
state of residence would have applied to the same item of income or capital, and this would give rise 
(if the exemption were granted) to double non-taxation.  
According to paragraph 32.3 of the Commentary, a qualification conflict arises if the source and 
residence States apply different treaty provisions as a result of the reference to domestic law in Article 
3(2) of the OECD MTC, for the interpretation of terms not defined in a tax treaty. Article 3(2) refers to 
the domestic law of the contracting states applying that treaty, unless the context requires a different 
meaning (Potgens et al. 2012). 
Vogel and Prokisch (1993) further explain that in in international tax law, a qualification conflict arises 
when a convention contains terms from domestic law that will be understood in their respective 
meanings by the residence or source state or that can be interpreted in an independent, 
“autonomous” way. Cases like this are regulated by Article 3(2) MTC if the term is used in the specific 
tax law of one of the contracting states which is covered by the convention. If this provision is not 
applicable – i.e. if the term is used in another tax law or in commercial law – or if the provision is not 
included in a convention, one is then faced with the question of how to proceed. 
There are many situations that are not covered by the wording of tax treaties. In these situations, tax 
treaties cannot be applied directly. Instead, they should (if possible) be applied by analogy. The 
interpretation is then based on the underlying principles of the treaty and not on the wording of the 
treaty provisions. Conflicts of qualification also exist where tax treaties are directly applicable. In these 
cases, differences in the treaty application which result from a conflict of qualification could and 
should be prevented by a subject-to-tax clause (Helminen 2010). 
Conflicts of qualification arise because of diverging tax treaty application by the contracting states. 
The different allocation of taxing rights may lead to double taxation or double non-taxation which can 
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be unfavourable for the taxpayers and tax administrations involved. The disagreement between the 
states may, of course, involve both the interpretation of the facts and the interpretation of the treaty 
provisions (Helminen 2010). 
In short, there are two potential conflicts of qualification that may arise –  
• Firstly, conflict of qualification arises if the source and residence states apply different treaty 
provisions as a result of the reference to domestic law in Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC, for 
the interpretation of terms not defined in a tax treaty. This is covered in the paragraph 32.4 of 
the Commentary; and 
• Secondly, conflict of qualification can arise due to different interpretation of facts and 
provisions of the tax treaties, meaning where the same circumstances are qualified differently 
in two jurisdictions (i.e. source and residence states). This is covered in the paragraph 32.5 of 
the Commentary. 
 
1.3. OECD Approach 
A partial solution to the qualification problem is provided by Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC. This 
provision establishes the fundamental principle that each state shall apply treaty terms according to 
its domestic tax law for the taxes to which the treaty applies, unless the context of the treaty otherwise 
requires. However, Article 3(2) presumes that a corresponding concept is present in the domestic tax 
law of the Contracting state concerned regarding the actual taxes to which the treaty applies (Vogel 
1996).  
The wording of Article 23A of the OECD MTC supports the view that where an object divergence 
conflict occurs, the event in question is taxable in only one of the two states concerned. As the event 
is thus taxed in only one state, there is no threat of double taxation. Article 23A obliges the residence 
state to grant tax treaty relief for income that is taxable in another state. The residence state, 
therefore, is not obliged to grant treaty relief if the income is not taxable in the other state.  
The wording, object and purpose of the OECD MTC, therefore, speak against the (direct) applicability 
of tax treaties in the case of an object divergence conflict. This is supported OECD’s interpretative 
Commentary which has, in its 2000 update, taken the position that qualification conflicts can be 
resolved by the proper interpretation of Article 23A. However, it is doubtful whether the wording of 
Article 23A, which was neither changed in 2000 nor later, expresses the meaning intended by the 
drafters of the 2000 update (Lang 2009). 
The interpretation of the OECD (MTC and its Commentaries) only applies to conflicts arising from the 
application of domestic law, and not if the conflicts arise, for instance, from an interpretation of the 
facts or of the application of the treaty itself. In the latter cases, these problems are dealt with in terms 
of the mutual agreement procedure provided under Article 25 of the OECD MTC. So, if faced with 
conflicts of qualification, countries not being a member of the OECD, like almost all developing 
countries, should consider whether such interpretation is acceptable for them when applying a tax 
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treaty, or otherwise rely on the mutual agreement procedure to resolve any relevant problems (de 
Goede 2013). 
It should be mentioned that conflicts of qualification have not been discussed by the UN Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters yet and, thus, the Commentaries to the UN MTC 
take no position with respect to this interpretative issue (de Goede 2013). 
1.4. Distinction with conflict of classification 
Before an item of income may be taxed, a determination must be made as to what type of income it 
constitutes under the different legal systems of international tax law. With respect to each item of 
income, a determination must be made as to its tax classification for purposes of domestic tax laws of 
the states involved, and for purposes of tax treaties. Because of the independence of these different 
legal systems, it is possible that the same entities and income items may be classified differently for 
different purposes.  
A classification conflict for domestic tax purposes is the difference of opinion between contracting 
states as to whether a certain domestic or foreign entity is a subject that is that is liable to tax under 
domestic tax laws or whether its participants are liable to tax. It is the dispute between member states 
concerning which person is liable for to tax. This difference of opinions may result in double taxation 
or double non-taxation. Therefore, in the context of “classification for tax treaty purposes” means the 
process of determining whether an entity is such a person liable to tax within the meaning of Article 1 
of the OECD MTC (Fibbe 2009).    
It is not always clear under what, if any, tax treaty income category an item of income qualifies. This 
uncertainty may lead to a situation where the two contracting states classify the item of income 
inconsistently for tax treaty purposes. Such a conflict may be referred to as a classification conflict of 
international tax law. This term includes both situations where the conflict leads to double taxation (i.e. 
a positive classification conflict) and situations where the conflict leads to double non-taxation (i.e. a 
negative classification conflict) (Helminen 2010).    
1.5. Objects of this study 
As stated above, a discussion on qualification conflicts relief is contained in Article 23 of the OECD 
MTC and its Commentary. This study will attempt to determine the adequacy of the solutions 
contained therein in relation to double tax treaties modelled on OECD MTC. This study will highlight 
particular far-reaching consequences of qualification conflicts, such as double taxation and double 
non-taxation, and then discuss the application of the proposed solutions. Simply put, the study will 
analyse the application of OECD MTC and its Commentaries in cases of conflicts of qualification, 
including the strength of Article 25 (another OECD solution to qualification conflicts), which deals with 
mutual agreement procedures between the contracting states’ competent authorities in the event of 
qualification conflict.  
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There has been some notable judicial decisions in the context of qualification conflicts globally. 
Furthermore, this study will evaluate the judicial approach to such conflicts. 
 
1.6. Sub-problems 
Special problems arise in interpreting treaty terms, where those terms are also used in the domestic 
laws of contracting states, since this may give rise to conflicts of qualification. This also poses 
problems for courts on how to interpret and apply treaties properly and consistently.  
The second sub-problem asks whether the revised interpretation of Article 23 adequately addresses 
the issue of conflict of qualification and secondly, whether it provides any relief to the problem. If not, 
should this question be resolved on the basis of an interpretation of the “renvoi clause” (i.e. Article 
3(2))?  
As a result of the technical complexity of international taxation, divergent interpretation and 
application of tax treaties by two given countries may often cause double taxation or double non-
taxation. The sub-problem is: Do double tax agreements modelled on the OECD MTC provide 
sufficient relief for potential double taxation or double non-taxation caused by conflict of qualification.   
The next sub-problem arises from conflicts of income allocation between two contracting states. This 
entails situations in which the two contacting parties classify the income differently for domestic tax 
law and treaty purposes. For instance, what happens when a permanent establishment is considered 
to exist by the residence state only? A conflict can arise if the residence state considers that there is a 
permanent establishment in the other state but the other state does not. It is also important to 
determine whether domestic tax law would classify all income of a permanent establishment as 
business profits. It is therefore necessary to separate the question whether there are business profits 
from the question whether there is a permanent establishment. 
Partnership structures use in an international context poses considerable taxing problems, due to the 
partnership’s heterogeneous treatment by different countries for domestic tax law purposes. The 
same partnership may be treated as taxable entity in one country, but as fiscally transparent in the 
other country. These two basic tax concepts may clash together resulting in a conflict of qualification 
between the countries involved. Same conflict can be brought by use of hybrid entity, as their tax 
treatment usually varies from one country to another. 
1.7. Chapter outline 
The remaining chapters will be arranged as follows: 
1.7.1. Chapter 2 – Interpretation of tax treaties 
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Chapter 2 will examine Article 3 of the OECD MTC. This article sets out the general definitions and 
principles which are to be used when interpreting a treaty. This chapter will focus on the states’ 
constitutional rules, states’ tax law interpretation principles applicable to tax statutes and whether tax 
treaties should be interpreted according to the internationally accepted interpretation principles which 
are used for international agreements generally and for tax treaties specifically. 
With an attempt to fully comprehend the concept of ‘conflict of qualification’, chapter 2 will highlight 
the importance of sound interpretation principles of international agreements such as tax treaties by 
discussing, inter alia, the following:  
• Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;  
• Article 3(2) (also known as the ‘renvoi clause’) of the OECD MTC;  
• The various international cases in which the courts have discussed the interpretation of tax 
treaties; and 
• Views of leading international tax authors, such as Professors Klaus Vogel and Michael Lang.  
This chapter will thus focus on the issue of which contracting state should apply the tax treaty and its 
domestic law interpretation in the situation where there are qualification conflicts.    
1.7.2. Chapter 3: Articles 23 and 25 of the OECD MTC 
This chapter examines the extent to which Articles 23 and 25 resolve the qualification conflict. This 
chapter considers: 
• The effectiveness of Article 23 in addressing conflicts of qualification. The focus is on 
paragraphs 32.1 – 32.7 of the Commentary to Article 23; 
• The phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State” as contained in the Article; and 
• The effectiveness of Article 25 in addressing conflicts of qualification.  
1.7.3. Chapter 4: Double taxation 
This chapter examines how conflicts of qualification lead to juridical double taxation i.e. instances 
where income or capital is taxed in the hands of the same taxpayer more than once, whether by a 
way of different taxes or, in an international context, by different taxing authorities. 
1.7.4. Chapter 5: Double non-taxation 
This chapter examines how conflicts of qualification can lead to double non-taxation in both source 
and resident states. It will also examine paragraph 4 of Article 23A (i.e. Article 23A(4)), whose 
purpose is to avoid double non-taxation as a result of disagreements between contracting states.  
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1.7.5. Chapter 6: International income attribution conflicts 
This chapter assesses the cross-border income attribution conflict, and will, inter alia, address: 
• The attribution of income for both domestic tax law and tax treaty purposes; and 
• Practical examples to highlight both complications of and potential solutions to qualification 
conflicts. 
1.7.6. Chapter 7: Taxation of cross-border partnerships and hybrid entities 
This chapter focus on the impact on of conflicts of qualification on taxation of cross-border 
partnerships, its partners and hybrid entities. It will deal with the following:  
• The application of OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentary to the taxation of cross-
border partnerships. 
• It highlights different features of partnerships and their different qualification for tax purposes. 
1.7.7. Chapter 8: International case law 
This chapter will summarise the existing case law, discussing how the courts have attempted to 
resolve the conflicts of qualification. Some examples of the qualification problems addressed in case 
law may help to define this difficult concept. 
1.7.8. Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This chapter will summarise the findings of the research, draw conclusions and propose areas 
requiring further research. 
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2. INTERPRETATION OF TAX TREATIES 
2.1. Background 
Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. Moreover, words are ambiguous and often their 
meanings change over time. It is also accepted that the English language is not an instrument of 
mathematical precision. Therefore, no document such as a treaty can expressly resolve all issues that 
may arise in the course of its application. Thus, like any other legal text, tax treaties require 
interpretation and leave room for disagreement. Treaties like other legal documents must be 
interpreted keeping in mind the intentions of the parties involved. These intentions cannot be 
completely circumscribed in words (Gulati 2013). 
Also, it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold set of possible circumstances which may 
arise in the future, and even if it were so, it is not possible to provide for all of them with absolute 
precision. No written document can thus cater for all possible circumstances. All these aspects add to 
give prominence to the problem of interpretation and application; and thus to the practical application 
of treaties (Gulati 2013).  
International agreements, like all legal texts, require interpretation. The need for interpretation can 
arise from a difference of opinion between contracting states; the agreement will then be interpreted 
by these states, or, if they have subjected themselves to its jurisdiction in general or for a particular 
case, by the International Court of Justice. Questions of interpretation with regard to application of a 
treaty can also arise, however, before domestic administrative authorities or courts (Vogel, 1996).   
The approach towards interpretation (of tax treaties) varies across the world. However, Gulati (2013) 
suggests there are three main approaches which are practised around the world: 
1. Objective approach 
• Under this approach, the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the 
document taken as a whole and to achieve the 'ordinary' meanings of words are assigned to 
the words of the document. This is the so-called Golden Rule of interpretation.  This is also 
regarded as the literal or legalistic method of interpretation and gives the adjudicator limited 
discretion.  For this reason it can be referred to as the objective or literal approach. However, 
this is prone to several problems including of translation and other cultural differences.  
2. Subjective approach 
• Under this approach, the intentions of the parties are determined drawing upon a broader 
range of material other than the literal meanings of the words of the treaty.. However, 
interpreting the intentions is itself more subjective.  
3. Teleological approach 
• Under this approach, the aims and objectives of the treaty are considered allowing scope for 
a much broader interpretation of the treaty. The treaty is interpreted so as to achieve the 
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purpose of the treaty and can adapt to changing circumstances. The rules of interpretation 
are thus more liberal. 
In practice, most countries will construe a tax treaty liberally, that is tend towards the Teleological 
approach. Where an interpretation based on the narrow literal meaning of certain words would give a 
result which is at odds with the intention of the treaty which broadly speaking is to relieve double 
taxation the broader Teleological approach seeks rather to achieve the broad objective. Therefore, in 
such cases a broader interpretation will usually be allowed. This is consistent with Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention (discussed below) which provides that treaties must be interpreted by the parties 
'in good faith', so that a broad interpretation is to be favoured over a narrower literal interpretation 
(Gulati 2013).  
The extent to which statutory text or statutory purpose should control the interpretation of an 
international agreement was actively disputed in the older literature on international law. Difference of 
opinion also existed regarding the meaning of protocols of negotiation and other materials. The most 
widely-held view was that treaty obligations are to be interpreted restrictively, because parties to a 
treaty in doubtful cases should only be presumed to have waived their sovereignty to the extent that is 
unequivocally apparent from the text of the treaty (Vogel 1996).  
In case of Gladden Estate vs. the Queen (1985) DTC 5188, the Canadian Federal Court said:  
“Contrary to an ordinary taxing statute a tax treaty must be given a liberal 
interpretation with a view of implementing the true intentions of the parties. A literal 
or legalistic interpretation must be avoided when the basic object of the treaty 
might be defeated or frustrated insofar as the particular item under consideration is 
concerned.” 
2.2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Tax treaties are examples of international agreements and thus subject ot international law treaties. 
Their creation and consequences are determined according to the rules contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “VCLT”) (Vogel 1996). 
The international law of treaty interpretation is codified in Articles 31 – 33 of the VCLT. Article 31(1) 
states the “general rule of interpretation” that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”.  
Article 31(1) contains three separate principles namely:  
1. Paramount principle 
• This is a radical idea that a treaty must always be interpreted in good faith. 
2. Secondary principle 
• It states that the words used in a treaty should be given their ordinary meaning.  
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• This principle is based on the view that the ordinary meaning of the words of the treaty must 
be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intention of the parties. This presumption 
is rebuttable. 
3. Tertiary principle 
• It states that the ordinary meaning to be given to the words of the treaty be determined, not in 
isolation, but - 
o in the context of the treaty; and  
o in the light of its object and purpose.  
Article 31(2) of the VCLT elaborates on this general rule providing that the context of a treaty 
comprises, in addition to its text, any related agreement or instrument accepted by the parties as 
related to the treaty. Article 31(3) requires to be “taken into account, together with the context” 
subsequent agreements between the parties, subsequent practice establishing the parties’ agreement 
regarding its interpretation, and any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. Article 31(4) allows for special meanings to be given to treaty terms where the 
parties so intend. 
Article 32 states that the interpreter of a treaty may have recourse to “supplementary means of 
interpretation”, including the preparatory work of the treaty (the travaux preparatoires) and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
Article 31 or to determine the meaning where the interpretation according to Article 31 is ambiguous 
or obscure, or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result (Gulati 2013).      
It should be noted that there is no direct reference to Commentaries in the VCLT. This leaves the 
debate open whether or not these fall within Article 32 only as supplementary material, and thus has 
less influence than if they were included under Article 31, the general principles. However, their 
widespread acceptance by the Courts renders this debate to be academic. The Commentaries are 
now updated from time to time separately from the MTC Convention itself (Gulati 2013) and have an 
influence as to how the MTC is interpreted.  
In interpreting international agreements according to these rules (of VCLT) the text of the treaty is of 
primary importance; i.e. the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms and the wording not of the individual 
provision, but that of the entire agreement taken in context. The (older) view that primarily what is 
looked for is the subjective intent of the parties to the treaty has given way to the broader form of 
interpretation. However, subjective elements are not entirely excluded from considerations as they are 
implied within the purpose of the treaty. The ‘purpose’ referred to by VCLT, certainly, is not 
synonymous with the subjective intention of the contracting states, but refers to the goal of the treaty 
as reflected objectively by the treaty as a whole taken in a broader context. Moreover, such purpose 
is subordinated to the wording of the treaty by the application of rule contained in Article 31 that the 
purpose shall influence interpretation merely by giving ‘light’ to the terms of the treaty. In other words, 
‘purpose’ is not itself an independent means of interpretation (Vogel 1996).  
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2.3. OECD Commentary 
The OECD MTC and its Commentary carry significant weight in the interpretation process of an actual 
treaty if the contracting states chose to follow the wording of the OECD MTC in drafting a certain 
provision in the actual treaty. It is then only reasonable to assume that they intended such a provision 
to have the meaning it has in the OECD MTC and as elaborated upon in the Commentary. This does 
not necessarily apply, however, if the wording of a provision deviates from the OECD MTC. In such 
an event, two alternatives have to be considered: The difference in wording may also entail a 
difference in meaning – or the meaning of the provision may be similar to the OECD MTC, despite the 
difference in wording. This problem cannot be solved in general but only through interpretation in 
each individual case. If the wording of a provision deviates from the OECD MTC, it is a matter of 
interpretation to determine whether the difference in wording also results in a different meaning. 
Consequently, a difference in wording alone is insufficient to rule out the relevance of the OECD MTC 
and the OECD Commentary. It is, however, also necessary to give reasons why the OECD 
Commentary should be considered under such circumstances (Lang et al. 2008). 
The OECD MTC and its Commentary are very important for the interpretation of tax treaties in that 
they provide a source from which the courts of different states can seek a common interpretation 
(Vogel 1996). 
Article 3 of the OECD MTC sets out the general definitions and principles which are to be used when 
interpreting a treaty. Article 3(2) contains a special rule of treaty interpretation. This is because a 
treaty cannot define each and every term used therein, and therefore it is important to specify a rule 
which may be used in case of terms undefined in a treaty. It states: 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, 
any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the 
meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the 
taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws 
of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that 
State.” 
There is a tension between using the domestic law meaning of a treaty term in accordance with article 
3(2) (which has the result that a treaty relieving provision has the same scope as a country’s taxing 
provision, so that if a treaty prevents the source state from taxing pensions, it cannot tax whatever it 
considers to be a pension under its law), and using a common meaning (which has the result that the 
treaty relief has the same scope in both countries) (Gulati 2013).  
Article 3(2) is drafted in mandatory language as it states that any undefined term “shall” have the 
meaning that it has under the domestic law of the state applying the treaty, unless the context 
otherwise requires. Thus, prima facie, the domestic legal meaning of the treaty term must always be 
used. The only specific exception to this rule is that the context may require the application of different 
meaning. Whether and when the context may so require, in principle is a matter of debate. 
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The caveat “unless the context requires otherwise” is one of the recurring questions in the debate 
surrounding article 3(2). Whether and when the context requires otherwise, however, is a precarious 
matter i.e. not every apparently convincing interpretation from the context should give rise to a 
divergence from the rule of Article 3(2), but only those based on strong arguments. Thus, whether the 
context suggests an alternative interpretation that is sufficiently persuasive to overthrow the domestic 
meaning of the treaty term at issue, is a matter that can be decided based on the facts of each case 
(Gulati 2013).  
The context in which a term is defined is to be determined by the intention of the contracting countries 
when signing the Convention, as well as the meaning given to the term in the legislation of the other 
country. The Commentary does not help when it comes to deciding what alternative meaning to that 
used in domestic tax law ought to be used, given that the context requires a different meaning. There 
is no general answer to this question: it is a matter of negotiation between the two countries.  
Rule of interpretation set out in Article 3(2) reflects a special relationship between a tax treaty and 
domestic laws of contracting countries. It shows a desire to preserve the tax sovereignty of the 
contracting country and acknowledges that a treaty does not exist in a legal vacuum, but necessarily 
operates on the basis of tax laws of the contracting countries to which it applies (Gulati 2013). 
When a treaty term is not defined in the treaty itself, or when it is inadequately defined, an issue of 
qualification often arises. Qualification (conflict) refers to a situation in which the contracting countries 
impute different interpretations to the term under their respective domestic laws (van Raad 2001). 
The Australian Tax Office (ATO TR 2001/13), for instance, takes a position that -  
“the commentaries…provide guidance on interpretation and application of the tax 
conventions and as a matter of practice will often need to be considered in 
interpretation of DTAs, at least where the wording is ambiguous which…is 
inherently more likely in treaties than in general domestic legislation. 
Unless it is apparent that the substance of the OECD Model has itself changed 
since a DTA was negotiated or the treaty in question does not conform to the 
OECD Model, or unless the Commentaries make clear that a former interpretation 
has actually been substantively altered, rather than merely elaborated, the ATO 
considers it appropriate, as a matter of practice, to consider, at least, the most 
recently adopted/published OECD Commentaries…as well as others which may 
have been available at the time of negotiation”. 
2.4. Judicial precedents in the interpretation of treaties 
Interpretation of tax treaties was summed up in the case of IRC vs. Commerz Bank AG [1990] STC 
285 (UK), which states that a judge ought to:  
• Use a purposive approach;  
• Bear in mind that the language of a treaty differs from the legal language found in domestic 
law and not necessarily use domestic legal precedent or technical rules;  
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• Bear in mind the 'good faith' principle;  
• Where appropriate, use supplementary means and travaux préparatoires (preparatory work); 
and 
• Bear in mind the reputation of foreign courts when relying on their judgments.  
Illustrative list of case laws supporting the use of commentaries for interpretation of treaties:  
• Sun Life Assurance of Canada vs. Pearson [1984] STC 461 (UK)  
• Crown Forest Industries Ltd. vs. the Queen [1992] 95 DTC (Canada Federal Court)  
• Cudd Pressure Control Inc. vs. the Queen [1999] CTC (Canada)  
• Thiel vs. FCT [1990] ATC 4717 (Australia)  
Other judicial precedents in the interpretation of treaties include:  
• “If the literal rules result in ambiguity or absurdity, the court should try to interpret in another 
manner” (River wear Commissioners vs. Adamson (1876-77) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 743, HL)  
• “Office of the judge is not to legislate, but to express the intention of the legislature” (Stock v 
Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 231 HL) 
• “Rules of interpretation in respect of international treaties are different to those applicable in 
respect of domestic laws” (Azadi Bachao Andolan 2003 263 ITR 706 Supreme Court of India)  
• “The language of an international convention has not been chosen by an English 
parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional English legislative idiom nor 
designed to be construed exclusively by English judges. It is addressed to a much wider and 
more varied judicial audience than is an Act of Parliament which deals with purely domestic 
law. It should be interpreted … unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English 
legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation” (Fothergill v Monarch Airlines 
Ltd. [1981] AC 251 (UK)) 
• This is also recognized by the High Court of Australia in Thiel, which held that “the Model 
Convention and Commentaries […] are documents which form the basis for the conclusion of 
bilateral double taxation agreements of the kind in question and […] provide a guide to the 
current usage of terms by the parties. They are, therefore, a supplementary means of 
interpretation to which recourse may be had under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention” 
• In McDermott Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 142 FCR 134 at 
144, the court takes the following position on this issue: “Certainly the commentary has been 
used to assist in the interpretation of double tax agreements based upon it, although there 
may be a theoretical difficulty in using commentary published after the adoption of a double 
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taxation agreement as relevant to the construction of that agreement…whether there may be 
a different result in taking into account commentary published after ratification of an 
agreement is not a matter that need concern us here”. 
2.5. Conclusion  
The OECD MTC and its Commentary could qualify as “supplementary means of interpretation” under 
Article 32 of VCLT. The preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion are 
expressly referred to in Article 32 of VCLT as examples of such material. The use of supplementary 
means of interpretation is not limited to material expressly mentioned in Article 32 of VCLT. Recourse 
may be had to any evidence establishing the common intention of the parties. If tax treaty 
negotiations are based on the OECD MTC and its Commentary may provide guidance in establishing 
the meaning of treaty provisions. Consequently, the OECD MTC and its Commentary qualify as 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT, provided that the treaty provision in 
question is based on the OECD MTC (Lang et al. 2008). 
There are two separate issues that arise from the discussions above, and they are as follows: 
• Since article 3(2) requires recourse to internal law as it is from time to time, there is a limit to 
changes to internal law, beyond which the change has no effect on interpretation. 
• A change in the law that does have effect in interpreting the treaty may breach the treaty; the 
remedy for a material breach is termination of all or part of the treaty (which may do more 
harm than good).  
On the limit of changes within article 3(2), the Commentary draws the line between preventing a state 
from changing its internal law to make the treaty partially inoperative and preventing the need to refer 
to earlier law, but is not very clear about how one determines the limit. 
Override is not possible in all countries because treaties may have a higher status than internal law. 
Some changes in the law that override the treaty are in order, for example, restoring the position to 
what both parties thought it was before a court decision to the contrary. The OECD report on treaty 
override disapproves of override even when designed to prevent improper use of the treaty. It 
encourages consultation to solve treaty problems and states that override will be publicly and 
forcefully condemned. 
The OECD Model Convention and the OECD Commentary carry significant weight in the 
interpretation of double taxation conventions. If a double taxation convention is, in principle, based on 
the OECD Model and a certain provision follows the wording of the OECD Model, it is then only 
reasonable to assume that the contracting states intended such a provision to have the meaning it 
has in the OECD Model, as outlined in the OECD Commentary. Amendments to the OECD Model 
Convention and to the OECD Commentary made after the conclusion of a double taxation convention 
have to be seen in a different light. Later Commentary amendments cannot serve to establish the 
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parties’ intentions upon conclusion of a double taxation convention. Such amendments may only play 
a limited role in the interpretation of previously concluded double taxation conventions if recourse to 
other means of interpretation remains inconclusive (Lang et al, 2008). 
In the cases where the treaty and domestic law conflict, the treaty must be interpreted in a way that 
would not frustrate its object and purpose. The Commentary supports this view (refer to paragraph 
9.5. of the Commentary in respect of Article 1 of OCED MTC). In interpreting the treaty to ensure the 
object and purpose of the relevant provisions are adhered to, the test is different under the treaty to 
domestic law. This is because the focus is upon “whether a main purpose” for the transaction was to 
secure a more favourable tax treatment inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty 
provisions. The domestic test has a lower threshold being a “more than merely incidental purpose” of 
tax avoidance. This difference could be important in situations where the treaty provisions conflict with 
domestic law (Elliffe et al, 2011). 
From a South African perspective, in the February 1995 matter of The State versus T Makwanyane 
and M Mchunu, the Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutionality of the death penalty. The then 
newly adopted Constitution (concluded in 1993) did not explicitly address the matter of capital 
punishment. It was left to the Constitutional Court to decide whether the death penalty is consistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution, Chapter Three in particular which sets out the fundamental 
rights to which every person shall be entitled under the Constitution. Chapter Three also sets out 
provisions by which the chapter is to be interpreted by the Courts. It was argued on behalf of the 
accused that the imposition of the death penalty for murder was a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment that should be declared unconstitutional.  
Chaskalson P made broad and resourceful use of international law in his delivery of judgment. In 
paragraphs 12-17 of the judgement, it was argued that documents used during the negotiating 
process (specifically those relating to the position of the death penalty), formed part of the context 
within which the Constitution should be interpreted. He considered circumstances existing at the time 
the Constitution was adopted, in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Chaskalson 
found authority permitting the use of such evidence in international law. He referred to the European 
Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights whose deliberations are 
informed by traveaux preparatoires as described by Article 32 of the VCLT. The learned Judge further 
referred to other countries where the constitution is the supreme law such as Germany, Canada, the 
United States and India, where courts may have regard to circumstances prevailing during the 
drafting of the Constitution. He also makes reference to the VCLT, which may assist the court in 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
In this case, the Constitutional Court adopted a liberal and creative approach to the interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights. Paragraph 9 of the judgement reads as follows –  
“…this Court dealt with the approach to be adopted in the interpretation of the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter Three of the Constitution. It gave its 
approval to an approach which, whilst paying due regard to the language that has 
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been used, is "generous" and "purposive" and gives expression to the underlying 
values of the Constitution…” 
The judgment is of great importance and interest, not only in that it declares capital punishment to be 
unconstitutional, but also in that it lays down fundamental guide-lines for constitutional interpretation. 
Chaskalson concludes that international and foreign authorities are of value because they analyse 
arguments for and against capital punishment and show how courts of other jurisdictions have dealt 
with the issue. Such sources may also have to be considered because of their relevance to Section 
35 (1) of Chapter Three of the Constitution, which states: 
"In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and shall where applicable, have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have 
regard to comparable foreign case law." 
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3. ARTICLES 23 AND 25 OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
3.1. Background 
Article 23 falls within Chapter V of the OECD MTC entitled “Methods for elimination of double 
taxation”, and it is split between Article 23A (the so-called “Exemption method”) and Article 23B 
(referred to as “Credit method”). 
These Articles deal with the so-called juridical double taxation where the same income or capital is 
taxable in the hands of the same person by more than one state. This case has to be distinguished 
especially from the so-called economic double taxation, where two different persons are taxable in 
respect of the same income or capital. If two states wish to solve problems of economic double 
taxation, they must do so in bilateral negotiations (paragraphs 2-3 of the Commentary). 
Unusually, Article 23 allows for two alternative methods (Couzin 2001): 
• Version A is a modified exemption system. The state of residence agrees to provide – 
o “exemption with progression” in respect of income or capital that, in accordance with 
the provisions of the convention, may be taxed in the other state; and 
o a foreign tax credit for tax imposed by the source state on dividends and interest.  
• Version B is a simple credit model. The State of residence allows a credit in respect of tax 
paid to the other state on income or capital that, in accordance with the provisions of the 
convention, may be taxed in the other state, but not exceeding the residence state tax 
attributable to such income or capital. 
As no international tax court exists, problems arising under treaty have to be adjudicated by one of 
the contracting states. One of the avenues of adjudication is to make use of the mutual agreement 
procedure. Under the general definitions (Article 3) in the OECD MTC, it is provided that a state will 
indicate in the treaty who will act as the competent authority. In a South African context, the 
competent authority is the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service or his duly 
authorised representative (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
The provisions of Article 25 deals with the mutual agreement procedure to resolve conflicts, such as 
qualification conflicts between contracting states, brought about differing interpretations of treaty 
terms or of domestic law in relation to the provisions of double tax treaty. Conflicts of qualification may 
result in different imposition or non-imposition of tax by either the resident or source state or both.  
3.2. Article 23 and qualification conflicts 
Here is an overview of both Articles 23A (exemption method) and 23B (credit method) as provided by 
Professors Honiball and Olivier (2011): 
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ARTICLE 23A  Overview 
Para 1 Resident state exempts income and capital which may be taxed in the source state. 
Para 2 Creates a deduction for tax paid in the source state on interest and dividends. The 
deduction is ring-fenced to such income. 
Para 3 Provides that the exempted income can be taken into account when calculating the 
tax on the other income and capital of the resident. 
Para 4 Prevents the income or capital from being exempt in both states. 
ARTICLE 23B  
Para 1 Provides for a deduction from the tax on the income or capital of the resident. The 
deduction is limited to the tax paid in the source state.  
Para 2 Provides that income or capital which is exempt under the treaty may nevertheless 
be taken into account when calculating the tax on the other income or capital of the 
resident. 
 
Paragraphs 32.1 through 32.7 of the Commentary contain guidance on how relief from double 
taxation is to be provided under the OECD Model in cases of conflicts of qualification. 
Paragraphs 32.1 – 32.2 of the Commentary states the following: 
“Both Articles 23A and 23B require that relief be granted, through the exemption or 
credit method, as the case may be, where an item of income or capital may be 
taxed by the State of source in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 
Thus, the State of residence has the obligation to apply the exemption or credit 
method in relation to an item of income or capital where the Convention authorises 
taxation of that item by the State of source. 
The interpretation of the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, may be taxed”, which is used in both Articles, is particularly important 
when dealing with cases where the State of residence and the State of source 
classify the same item of income or capital differently for purposes of the 
provisions of the Convention.” 
In cases of conflict of qualification, the Commentary, not the Model itself (meaning not any specific 
Article of the MTC), considers that where the source state interprets the treaty so as to preclude its 
right to tax under the treaty, the state of residence may consider that the item of income may not be 
taxed by the state of source in accordance with the provisions of the convention and, thus, does not 
become required by Article 23A(1) to exempt the item of income under the requirements of the treaty. 
In that case, the Commentary considers that the residence state is not bound by the treaty 
classification of the income made by the source state, but by the result of such a classification made 
by the source state preventing it to exercise its tax jurisdiction (Prats 2011). 
However, the involved countries could classify the income inconsistently for the purposes of tax treaty 
provisions. If so, it becomes relevant to interpret the sentence “in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention, may be taxed”. If inconsistencies arise from the application of the provisions of the 
tax treaty, due to the differences included in the domestic laws of the contracting states, the income is 
still being taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, as it is interpreted and applied 
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by the source state. As a result, the residence country, despite of the existing conflict of qualification 
must grant the corresponding double tax relief measure. 
In the context of conflicts of qualification between the state of source and the state of residence, for 
purposes of elimination of double taxation, paragraph 32.3 of the Commentary provides that:  
“where due to differences in the domestic law between the State of source and the State of residence, 
the former applies, with respect to a particular item of income or capital, provisions of the Convention 
that are different from those that the State of residence would have applied to the same item of 
income or capital, the income is still being taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, 
as interpreted and applied by the State of source. In such a case, therefore, the two Articles require 
that relief from double taxation be granted by the State of residence, notwithstanding the conflict of 
qualification resulting from these differences in domestic law.” 
According to paragraph 32.3, a qualification conflict arises if the source and residence states apply 
different treaty provisions as a result of the reference to domestic law in Article 3(2) of the OECD 
MTC, for the interpretation of terms not defined in a tax treaty (Potgens et al. 2012). 
Since 2000, and as a result of the OECD Partnership Report implemented in the Commentary, the 
qualification conflicts have been resolved by requiring the residence state to follow the source state’s 
qualification. This position is based on the wording of Article 23 (23A and 23B read together). The 
residence state must provide double taxation relief (credit or exemption) for an income component 
that “in accordance with the provisions of this convention, may be taxed in the other contracting State” 
(Potgens at al. 2012). This means if the conflict only arises as a consequence of applying the different 
domestic laws, but the source country applies the treaty correctly to that income, the country of 
residence should then grant the relief as the source country levied the tax in accordance with the 
treaty (de Goede 2013). Therefore, the resident state, when applying Article 23, does not categorise 
the income itself or check whether it would have been allowed to tax the income if it were the source 
state. It examines whether the source state has taxed the income in accordance with its domestic law 
and the relevant double tax agreement. 
Paragraph 32.5 of the Commentary states the following – 
“Article 23 A and Article 23 B, however, do not require that the State of residence 
eliminate double taxation in all cases where the State of source has imposed its 
tax by applying to an item of income a provision of the Convention that is different 
from that which the State of residence considers to be applicable…conflicts 
resulting from different interpretation of facts or different interpretation of the 
provisions of the Convention must be distinguished from the conflicts of 
qualification…where the divergence is based not on different interpretations of the 
provisions of the Convention but on different provisions of domestic law...States 
should use the provisions of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), and in 
particular paragraph 3 thereof, in order to resolve this type of conflict in cases that 
would otherwise result in unrelieved double taxation.” 
The solution for qualification conflicts proposed in the Commentary (and as discussed above) has its 
origin in the International Tax Group (Jones et al. 1996). An important difference with the International 
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Tax Group’s interpretation is the restrictive definition of the qualification conflicts applied in the 
Commentary. This means that if the two states does not apply Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC 
because, for example, its domestic law has failed to define a term that requires interpretation or if the 
meaning attributed to it in domestic law is applied in a different context than that in the applicable tax 
treaty, or if it has no specific legal meaning, then this would involve a conflict of interpretation within 
the meaning of paragraph 32.5 of the Commentary. Such an interpretation conflict must be resolved 
by means of the mutual agreement procedure of Article 25 of the OECD MTC. Paragraph 32.5 of the 
Commentary describes interpretation conflicts as differences that arise due to different interpretations 
of tax treaty provisions or different interpretations of the facts being followed (Potgens at al. 2012). 
Solutions put forward elsewhere in the Commentary indicate that the OECD is aware that its definition 
of qualification conflicts is rather restrictive. An example of this is paragraph 48 of the Commentary to 
Article 7 (i.e. Business profits taxation article) that was included in 2008: If both contracting states 
apply different methods for the allocation of free capital to a permanent establishment (both methods 
being in accordance with the authorized OECD approach), the method applied by the state in which 
the permanent establishment is situated must be followed (Potgens at al. 2012). 
Finally, the OECD (in paragraphs 56.1 – 56.3 of the Commentary) considers that inconsistencies 
resulting from characterizations granted by the involved states might lead to loopholes benefiting from 
double non-taxation. In order to counteract potential tax planning targeted to this end, the OECD 
suggests that in case the state of source and the state of residence adopt different interpretations of 
the facts or of the provisions of the Convention, the state of residence is not obliged to grant the 
exemption relief, when the source state has exempted or reduced its taxation and the residence 
country interprets that the tax must be actually paid at source. In addition, when due to the differences 
in domestic laws, the source state applies a provision inconsistent with the double tax treaty article 
that residence would have applied, the latter is not required to exempt this income (see paragraphs 
32.6 and 32.7 of the Commentary). 
3.3.  Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedures) 
To resolve qualification conflicts, Article 25 of the OECD MTC provides for a ‘mutual agreement 
procedure’. This procedure consists of negotiation between the ‘competent authorities’ of the 
contracting states with the view to secure the uniform application of the tax convention in both 
countries (Groen 2002).  
Where a conflict of qualification arises due to differences in the domestic law between the state of 
source and the state of residence and in consequence the former applies to a particular item of 
income provisions of the convention that are different from those that the state of residence would 
have applied to the same item, the income is still taxed in accordance with the provisions of the 
convention, as interpreted and applied by the state of source. In such a case, the tax credit method 
could be applied but the solution to be implemented in general requires that the competent authorities 
of the two states consult each other through the mutual agreement procedure in order to clarify 
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whether the conflict results from the differences in the domestic laws or from the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the convention or from a differing interpretation of the factual situation (Lousa 
2011). 
When the qualification conflicts arise between the contracting states due to the differing interpretation 
of the facts or the different interpretation of the provisions of the treaty, the OECD Commentary on 
Article 23 do not impose the obligation to grant the credit or the exemption relief, in relation to the 
taxation applied by the source state. Examples about the three potential conflicts of qualifications 
(domestic laws, interpretation of facts and provision of the treaty) are included in the Commentaries 
on Article 23, paragraph 32.4 (domestic laws) and 32.5 (interpretation of facts and provisions of the 
Convention). In those cases, the solution must be obtained through the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
or by accepting as a final result an unrelieved double taxation. 
Here is an overview of Article 25 as provided by Professors Honiball and Olivier (2011): 
ARTICLE 25  Overview 
Para 1 Taxpayers have the right to appeal (within 3 years) to the tax authorities in the state 
of Residence in circumstances where taxation is not in accordance with a treaty.  
Para 2 Where the objection appears to be justified, the competent authority must endeavour 
to solve the dispute. Agreements reached by the competent authorities will be 
implemented notwithstanding any time limits under the domestic law. 
Para 3 Competent authorities may consult one another to solve the problems of treaty 
interpretation and application, as well as to resolve any problems of double taxation, 
whether or not dealt within the treaty. 
Para 4 Consultation between competent authorities may take any form, including joint 
meetings between them or their representatives. 
Para 5 Provision is made for a mandatory arbitration of issues unresolved within 2 years at 
the request of the taxpayer. 
 
To resolve these conflicts (of qualification), Article 25 provides for a ‘mutual agreement procedure’. 
This procedure consists of negotiations between the ‘competent authorities’ of the contracting states 
with a view to secure the uniform application of the tax convention in both countries (Zuger 2002). 
Article 25(1) and 25(2) provide that the competent authorities of the two contracting states must 
endeavour to resolve disputes leading to inconsistent taxation under the convention (Rohatgi 2002). It 
is specifically provided that the mutual agreement procedure exists irrespective of any domestic 
remedies (see Article 25(1)). The result is that a taxpayer who makes use of the mutual agreement 
procedure may still want to or need to object and appeal against an assessment in terms of domestic 
law. Unlike under domestic legislation where a taxpayer has to wait for a formal assessment to make 
use of the objection procedure, the mutual agreement procedure may be initiated by a taxpayer once 
he or she is certain that a contracting state will apply the treaty in a specific manner without a formal 
assessment having been received (see paragraph 12 of the Commentary on Article 25). A taxpayer 
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has three years from the date of the first notification of an action resulting in a liability to make use of 
the procedure (see Article 25(1)).  
According to Article 25(3) of the OECD MTC, the competent authorities will try to settle “any difficulties 
or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the convention”. The competent authorities 
will procedure shall solve conflicts between the contracting states (Zuger 2002).  
Paragraphs 50 and 51 of the OECD Commentary to Article 25(3) states the following: 
“The first sentence of this paragraph invites and authorises the competent 
authorities to resolve, if possible, difficulties of interpretation or application by 
means of mutual agreement. These are essentially difficulties of a general nature 
which concern, or which may concern, a category of taxpayers, even if they have 
arisen in connection with an individual case normally coming under the procedure 
defined in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
This provision makes it possible to resolve difficulties arising from the application 
of the Convention. Such difficulties are not only those of a practical nature, which 
might arise in connection with the setting up and operation of procedures for the 
relief from tax deducted from dividends, interest and royalties in the Contracting 
State in which they arise, but also those which could impair or impede the normal 
operation of the clauses of the Convention as they were conceived by the 
negotiators, the solution of which does not depend on a prior agreement as to the 
interpretation of the Convention.” 
Paragraph 3 of Article 25 may be used to agree on the definition of a specific term used in the treaty, 
or on procedures to give effect to a specific treaty provision. The resolution reached through the 
mutual agreement procedure (MAP) will thus potentially concern a number of taxpayers, rather than 
solely a specific taxpayer or the parties to a specific transaction (as in a case under paragraph 1 of 
Article 25) (Paragraph 38 of the UN Guide to MAP). 
Some countries have found that the use of the authority provided by Article 25(3) helps the 
implementation of the provisions of the treaty. In addition, where mutual agreements reached under 
Article 25(3) apply to all taxpayers or a general category of taxpayers, the publication of such 
agreements, which are not specific to particular cases and therefore do not mention any taxpayer 
specific information, may serve to provide guidance and prevent potential future disputes (Paragraph 
40 of the UN Guide to MAP). 
The treaty places neither an obligation, nor a time limit within which the dispute has to be solved, on 
the competent authorities. An agreement reached under the mutual agreement procedure will be 
binding despite any time limits set under domestic legislation (see Article 25(2)). It is clear that the 
mutual agreement procedure involves two stages, i.e. firstly at taxpayer-competent authority level and 
secondly, at competent authority-competent authority level (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
3.4. Conclusion 
When Articles 23A and 23B are interpreted in accordance with the general rule of interpretation 
embodied in Article 31 of VCLT, that is to say in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the words “in accordance with the provisions of this convention, may be taxed” in their 
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context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention, the state of residence must 
conform to the characterisation of an item of income for the purpose of the relevant provisions 
(Engelen 2004).  
The approach taken by the OECD update in 2000 has received mixed reactions. It has been argued 
that this approach lacks a legal basis under Article 23(1) of the OECD Model, and that it might be 
regarded by source states as an invitation to extend the taxation rights they have under the treaty, 
simply by changing either the domestic law as such or merely just its interpretation. Residence states, 
however, that are not willing to give up their taxation rights may always argue that they do not have to 
follow the source state’s position if they intend to maintain their taxation rights as a result of an 
autonomous interpretation of the treaty. They can consider themselves to be required by the “context” 
of the treaty to do so. As a result, the number of cases of double taxation might even increase. 
Despite these objections, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs has not reconsidered its approach 
but, in its 2008 Update, has even extended the scope of that approach in order to be able to prevent 
double non-taxation in certain other situations. The authority for that approach is weak, since the 
OECD Update has not broadened its interpretation of Article 23A(1) of the OECD Model in general, 
but only for situations where it is in the interest of the tax authorities to generate additional tax 
revenues (Lang 2009). 
It cannot yet be confirmed whether the opinion of the OECD on Article 23(1) of the OECD model 
convention has gained acceptance in practice. There have been doubts that the wording of the 
provision expresses the meaning intended by the OECD since the year 2000. It is often contested that 
the phrase “taxed…in accordance with the provisions of the Convention” actually contains a reference 
to the domestic practice of the source state. In any event, this language does not necessarily seem to 
imply the understanding intended by the OECD since 2000 (Lang 2004). 
Furthermore, the phrase “taxed…in accordance with the provisions of the Convention” could also be 
understood as meaning that it is up to the tax authorities of the state of residence to judge either 
independently from the treaty or as an applying state in accordance with Article 3(2) of the OECD 
MTC based on the understanding familiar to its domestic tax law, whether the source state has the 
taxation right in a specific situation. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that some states support 
the view that the opinion expressed since 2000 in the OECD commentary is not covered by the 
wording of the model convention (Lang 2004). 
Other opinions, however, regard the new commentary on Article 23 of the OECD model convention as 
relevant for the interpretation of Article 23(1) of the OECD model convention. These views are based 
on the assumption that the meaning supported by the OECD commentary since 2000 is covered by 
the wording, or that the intention of the authors of the OECD commentary is explicit enough to replace 
the clear wording of the convention (Lang 2004). 
If one decides, however, to share the view expressed in the commentary on the OECD MTC, either 
only for future tax treaties or for all tax treaties based on the OECD model convention, another 
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problem appears. The OECD commentary assumes that the state of residence should be bound by 
the qualification of the source state only if the qualification results from the domestic tax law of the 
source state. Some scholars have pointed out that they see no reason for this distinction in the 
wording of Article 23(1) of the OECD model convention. Therefore, there is a risk that, contrary to the 
intention of the OECD Fiscal Committee, Article 23(1) of the OECD model convention will result in a 
commitment to the qualification of the source state, even if this commitment does not result from the 
originally domestic legislation but from a different interpretation of the convention provisions, or a 
different interpretation of the facts (Lang 2004). 
All these considerations show that there is no certainty over how Article 23(1) of the OECD model 
convention is actually suitable to prevent double non-taxation in cases of qualification conflicts. The 
opinions supported by the various states are completely different. We are far from having a 
consolidated view on the matter. Due to the diverging opinions in academic literature, one can 
assume that the courts will continue to issue different decisions. 
The question also arises as to the binding effect of decisions reached under the mutual agreement 
procedure. Article 25(2) stresses that any agreement reached by the competent authorities shall be 
implemented and the OECD Commentary on Article 25 makes it clear that a mutual agreement is 
binding on the tax authorities (see paragraph 35). However, in IRC v Commerzbank AG and IRC v 
Bancodo Brazil SA it was held that a mutual agreement procedure had no authority in the English 
courts as the decisions of a competent authority merely express the views of the tax authorities of the 
two contracting states and can be either right or wrong (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
The binding authority of the mutual agreement procedure on tax authorities can be understood in light 
of the fact that as treaty is an agreement between the two contracting states (including the mutual 
agreement procedure), the states have agreed in advance to be bound by the outcome of the 
procedure. However, the same does not hold true for the taxpayer. The result is that a resident or 
national who is aggrieved by the decision, can still approach domestic courts to settle the issue. In 
such circumstances the court will not be bound by the decision reached under mutual agreement 
procedure (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
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4. DOUBLE TAXATION 
4.1. Background 
According to OECD (n.d.), the term double taxation arises when comparable taxes are imposed in two 
or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same taxable income or capital, e.g. where 
income is taxable in the source state and in the resident state of the recipient of such income. 
Two different types of double taxation, however, can be distinguished: 
• Juridical double taxation generally refers to the situation where the same taxpayer is 
subject to comparable tax on the same income for identical periods in two or more states. 
• Economic double taxation is a situation where an item of income or capital is taxed in two 
or more states in the same tax period, but that income or capital is in the hands of different 
taxpayers. 
A fundamental difference between juridical and economical double taxation is consequently that the 
latter type refers to situations where the income is taxed in the hands of different persons. An 
important example is the taxation of income generated through a company or a similar business 
vehicle regarded as taxable person. If the taxation follows the classical system, which represents a 
straightforward form of economic double taxation, the income will be taxed first in the hands of the 
entity (corporate taxation) and then additionally in the hands of the owner (dividend taxation). Unlike 
international juridical double taxation, this double taxation is intentional in the sense that it has been 
deliberately established through the legislation as a method of taxation. Many countries have, 
however, adopted systems designed to avoid these cases of economic double taxation (Barendfeld, 
2005).  
Tax treaties are designed to deal with double taxation on income derived from cross-border 
transactions. If, however, the two Contracting countries do not arrive at the same conclusion with 
regard to the tax rights under the treaty, juridical double taxation can occur today (Tan 2006). 
One reason for double taxation are so-called “qualification conflicts” where the same circumstances 
are qualified differently in two jurisdictions (Hoor 2010). 
4.2. An example of double taxation as a result of qualification conflict 
Hybrid instruments are financing instruments that bear both equity and debt characteristics and 
qualify, in cross-border scenarios, as equity in one jurisdiction and as debt in the other. Accordingly, 
payments under such instruments should qualify (at the same time) as dividends or interest, 
respectively. Therefore, hybrid instruments may lead to double taxation (Hoor, 2010). 
An example of double taxation as a result of qualification conflict is illustrated as follows (Hoor 2010): 
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A company resident in State A (“A-Co”) grants EUR 15m to its subsidiary in State B (“B-Co”) under a 
financing instrument bearing both equity and debt characteristics. The annual payments under the 
instrument amount to EUR 750,000. Under the application of the domestic tax laws of both states, 
State B classifies the financing instrument as equity (and the corresponding payments as dividends) 
whereas State A classifies the instrument as debt (and the corresponding payments as interest). 
While the dividend payments are not tax deductible in State B, the same payments qualify as interest 
payments and are fully subject to tax in State A, i.e. resulting in economical double taxation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Should State A and State B have concluded a tax treaty along the lines of the OECD MTC, the 
qualification conflict could be solved in the frame of a Mutual Agreement Procedure (Article 25 of the 
OECD MTC). 
4.3. Double tax relief 
There are two main techniques used to achieve double tax relief: the exemption method and the 
credit method. According to the exemption method one state (i.e. the residence state), excludes the 
foreign income from domestic taxation in cases where the source state is given the exclusive taxing 
rights. A full exemption is often limited in some respect. A common approach is to recognise the 
exempted income when determining the taxation of the domestic income, in order to apply a higher 
tax bracket in a progressive tax system (Barendfeld, 2005). 
Under the credit method, the residence state includes all income, domestic and foreign, in the tax 
base. Upon taxation, double taxation is relieved by granting a credit for the tax paid in the source 
state against the domestic tax. Where the foreign tax rates exceed the domestic ones, double taxation 
is avoided in full. Where the situation is reversed, double taxation is relieved. A distinction is made 
B-Co 
A-Co 
Hybrid financing instrument 
EUR 15m 
State A 
State B 
Remuneration: EUR 750k 
(Payments classified as 
interest) 
Remuneration: EUR 750k 
(Payments classified as 
dividends) 
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between ordinary and full credit. An ordinary credit, which is common, limits the credit to domestic tax. 
That is, where the foreign tax exceeds the domestic tax, a credit is only granted up to the domestic 
level. In contrast to this, where a full credit is allowed, the excess amount of tax is also credited 
(Barendfeld, 2005).  
Apart from the exemption and credit methods, taxpayers may in many countries deduct the foreign tax 
from the tax base, this relieving the double taxation. Foreign taxes are consequently regarded as a 
deductible cost when computing the taxable income. This approach can be referred to as the 
deduction method. 
Relief of double taxation in the event of conflict of qualification, like many other treaty benefits, is 
further complicated by conflicts in the characterization of income, instruments, or entities by countries 
(Arnold et al. 2003).  
An important issue in any system for double taxation relief is the determination of source. As 
discussed above, under the OECD approach, source is addressed implicitly by requiring the 
residence state to provide an exemption or credit in respect of income, or tax on that income, which 
may be taxed in the source state “in accordance with the provisions of this Convention”. This 
provision would override domestic source rules in this regard. 
For example, income that may be taxed in the other state but, under domestic concepts, would not be 
foreign source, will qualify for exemption or credit. Under the domestic law approach, source may be 
dealt with expressly, by including a stipulation that income or gains of a resident of a contracting state 
that may be taxed in the other contracting state in accordance with the convention shall be deemed to 
arise from sources in that other state. In the absence of such a provision, the domestic law approach 
may provide little effective relief. 
In either case, where source conflicts are resolved by appeal to taxation “in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention” how is that decided? Whose law governs whether the taxation is in 
accordance with the convention, that of the state of source or that of the state of residence? Should 
this issue be resolved in Article 23, or be left to the mutual agreement procedure? There has not been 
any clear answers for these questions, at least from the Commentary perspective. 
Under Article 23 of the OECD MTC, the residence State is only bound to eliminate double taxation 
when, according to the treaty, the source State is enabled to impose tax (paragraph 32.1 of the 
Commentary on Article 23). However, application of Article 23 does not necessarily imply that in order 
to eliminate double taxation the residence state has to mandatorily follow the income treaty 
classification given by the source state. As a result, the OECD MTC establishes different patterns to 
solve the possible conflicts that may arise (Prats, 2011). 
These are listed as follows: 
• If the conflict of qualification derives from interpretation issues of the treaty, for instance when 
the residence and the source state consider that a different provision becomes applicable to 
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the item of income, the conflict of qualification needs to be resolved through the mutual 
agreement procedure established in article 25 of the Model (in particular, paragraph 32.4). 
• If the conflict of qualification derives from differences of domestic tax law of both contracting 
states but, in any case, both states act in accordance with the treaty, state of residence must 
nevertheless grant alleviation of double taxation (paragraph 32.3). 
• If the conflict of qualification is the result of different appreciation of the facts by both 
contracting states, the conflict must be solved through the mutual agreement procedure as 
well (paragraph 32.5). 
This is illustrated in the table below as follows:  
Instances of double taxation 
Due to: Differences in domestics 
laws of contracting 
States 
Different interpretation 
of facts 
Different interpretation 
of DTT provisions 
OECD Solution: Residence State must 
grant relief. 
Mutual Agreement 
Procedure (Art.25.3) 
Mutual Agreement 
Procedure (Art.25.3) 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Under either approach, the tax treaty articles do not generally deal with economic double taxation 
(although the mutual agreement procedure may do so), “concurrent full liability to tax” (residence 
conflicts), or triangular situations. The treaty provisions on relief of double taxation are unnecessary 
where the distributive provisions of the convention allocate taxing jurisdiction on an exclusive basis. 
Thus, these articles serve a residual function of avoiding double taxation where the source and 
residence states are permitted to (and do) tax the same items of income. Limiting the jurisdiction of 
the source state will not eliminate double taxation unless the residence state allows an exemption or a 
foreign tax credit (Couzin, 2001). 
The solution adopted by the OECD Commentaries on Article 23 does not solve all potential double tax 
relief scenarios in cases of qualification conflicts. In particular, when the country of partnership’s 
organization treats the entity as non-transparent, whereas the country where the partners are resident 
considers the partnership as a flow-through entity. Under these particular tax circumstances, the state 
or partnership’s organization is obliged to grant double tax relief as regards source taxation. Thus, the 
double taxation is relieved at its first level. 
Paragraph 34 of the Commentary states that the exemption method is the most practical method for 
providing relief from international double taxation because it relieves the state of residence from 
undertaking the investigations of the actual taxation position in the other state. The operation of the 
exemption method depends on whether the income may be taxed in the state of source. If so, there is 
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an absolute obligation to exempt, subject to the exceptions contained in Article 23A (2), (3) or (4) 
(paragraph 34.1 of the Commentary) (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
According to Vogel (1996), the exemption method is the method which is traditionally used in 
continental Europe to relief double taxation (arising from conflicts of qualification).  
Lang (2004) suggest that in order to avoid double taxation (i.e. positive conflict of qualification), it 
must be recommended that the state of residence accept the source state interpretation or at least 
abolishes double taxation, to the extent the source state interpretation is the proper application of the 
treaty. Only if the source state clearly applied the treaty improperly, should the state of residence 
enter into a different interpretation. 
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5. DOUBLE NON-TAXATION 
5.1. Background  
A possible double non-taxation may also be the outcome of the use of cross-border hybrid financial 
instruments. In such a case, the OECD MTC does neither clearly state what is the position of the 
Model itself, nor contains specific measures to counteract or prevent the situation to happen. Until 
recently, tax treaties mainly dealt with the alleviation of international juridical double taxation, and very 
few remarks and provisions were devoted to tackle the issue of double non-taxation. In the actual 
version of the OECD MTC, there are only a few general indications on how to deal with this situation 
by the residence state, despite the fact that also the source state may indeed also apply measures to 
counteract double non-taxation (Prats, 2011). 
Double non-taxation can be split into two categories. The first one is the intentional double non-
taxation (Lang 2004). This is when the state has the intention not to tax the income. The reason for 
this could for example be income from teachers, research and students. The aim of this is to stimulate 
the exchange of knowledge across borders (Lang 2004). Another example is tax heavens that have 
the intention to attract foreign investors. It is in other words the intention from the state that the 
income should not be taxed. The other one is unintentional double non-taxation. It is when the 
taxpayer, not the state, has the intention to avoid tax (Scapa et al. 2005). 
5.2. OECD Approach to double non-taxation 
Paragraph 32.6 of the Commentary to Article 23, which deals with double non-taxation arising from 
conflicts of qualification, reads as follows - 
“The phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed” 
must also be interpreted in relation to possible cases of double non-taxation that 
can arise under Article 23A. Where the State of source considers that the 
provisions of the Convention preclude it from taxing an item of income or capital 
which it would otherwise have had the right to tax, the State of residence should, 
for purposes of applying paragraph 1 of Article 23 A, consider that the item of 
income may not be taxed by the State of source in accordance with the provisions 
of the Convention, even though the State of residence would have applied the 
Convention differently so as to have the right to tax that income if it had been in 
the position of the State of source. Thus the State of residence is not required by 
paragraph 1 to exempt the item of income, a result which is consistent with the 
basic function of Article 23 which is to eliminate double taxation.” 
Where, for example, the residence state’s domestic law categorizes the income as type that the 
source state has the exclusive right to tax and the source state’s domestic law categorises the income 
as a different type that it does not have the right to tax, there can be double exemption. This is a 
problem confined to Article 19 (Government service) and Article 20 (Students) (if the student or 
business apprentice becomes a resident of the state in which he is studying or training) and to a 
variation to Article 18 (Pensions) contained in the Commentary (Jones 2003).  
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Another example that could lead to potential double non-taxation as a result of conflicts of 
qualification is as follows - 
An entity resident in State E buys its own shares from shareholders in State P. According to its 
domestic law, State E (fiscally transparent) characterizes the income as capital gain and thus does 
not tax it (Article 13.4 of OECD MTC). According to its domestic law, State P (corporate status) 
characterizes the income as dividend and gives exemption according to the E-P treaty (different from 
OECD Model). 
5.3. Methods to prevent double non-taxation 
OECD states that it is possible to avoid double non-taxation in instances of qualification conflicts by 
interpreting the meaning “may be taxed in the other contracting state”. Both article 23A and 23B 
contains the meaning. It is said in the Commentary that the phrase “in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention, may be taxed” is important when two contracting states classify the same item of 
income differently (paragraph 32.2 of the Commentary). 
Article 23A(1) OECD MTC can solve a conflict of qualification that occurs from the contracting states 
domestic law. However, according to Lang (2004), there is no certainty over how article 23A(1) is 
actually suitable to prevent double non-taxation in cases of conflict of qualifications. One problem with 
Article 23A(1) is that it assumes that the state of residence should be bound by the qualification of the 
source state only if the qualification results from domestic law in the source state (Lang 2004). Vogel’s 
(2003) opinion is that this Article does not solve all the problems with conflict of qualification. 
According to the Commentary, when the conflict of qualification arises as a result of differences 
between in the contracting states domestic laws, it could be solved by interpreting article 23A(1). 
Paragraph 32.2 of the Commentary states that: “The interpretation of the phrase in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed, which is used in both Articles, is particularly 
important when dealing with cases where the State of residence and the State of source classify the 
same item of income or capital differently for purposes of the provisions of the Convention.” 
When the exemption method (i.e. Article 23A) is used, the resident state is obligated to exempt the 
income regardless of whether or not the source state actually subjects the income to tax, if another 
solution is not expressly proved by the double tax convention. When both states in fact do not impose 
tax under its domestic laws, it would result in double non-taxation (Kleist 2012). The exemption 
method by itself could in that situation lead to double non-taxation when the source state has taxing 
rights under the treaty but does not levy any tax under its domestic law and the resident state does 
not have any taxing rights. The aim of using the exemption method is to ensure neutral competition in 
the source state (Lang 2004). 
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5.4. Conclusion 
In 2000 the OECD added a new paragraph to the exemption method. Article 23A(4) is a 
complementary rule to Article 23A(1) and is supposed to cover those cases when two contracting 
states disagree on facts or in the interpretation of the provisions in a double tax convention. The 
purpose of this paragraph is to avoid double non-taxation as a result of disagreements between the 
state of residence and the state of source (OECD 1999). A conflict may arise when the source state 
interprets the facts of a case in such a way that an item of income falls under a provision that 
eliminates the source state's right to tax and the resident state adopts a different interpretation in the 
provision in the double tax treaty and which result in that the resident state has no right to tax the 
income (paragraph 56.1 of the Commentary). According to Lang (2004), Article 23A(4) was added as 
an explicit provision aiming to ensure that in certain qualifications conflicts tax will at least be levied 
once when certain conflicts of qualification cases result in double non-taxation as a consequence of 
the application of the convention if the state of residence (paragraph 34.1 of the Commentary). 
If the double non-taxation is based on the interpretation of domestic law of the source state, Article 
23A (4) is not applicable (Lang 2010). OECD expressly states in the Commentary that Article 23A(4) 
is not applicable when the source state may tax the income according to the double tax convention 
but does not tax the income according to domestic law (paragraph 56.1 of the Commentary). 
Paragraph 35 of the Commentary states that occasionally contracting states may find it reasonable in 
certain circumstances to negotiate an exception to the absolute obligation on the state of residence to 
give exemption in cases where neither Article 23A(3) or 23A(4) would apply. According to the 
Commentary, the need for such an exception would arise in order to avoid double non-taxation, for 
example if no tax on specified items of income or capital is provided under the domestic laws of the 
state of source, or tax is not effectively collected owing to special circumstances such as the set off of 
losses or the statutory time limit having expired. The Commentary states that the contracting states 
may negotiate any one of the following three methods to avoid such double non-taxation (Honiball & 
Olivier 2011):  
• The relevant income article may itself be amended;  
• An exception to the general rule may be made where one of the states adopts the exemption 
method and the other the credit method in order to achieve reciprocity; or  
• Another exception to the general rule may be made where a state wishes to apply the credit 
method to specific types of income.. 
International tax planners may take advantage of mismatches between two or more tax systems for 
the purpose of reducing the total tax liability through double non-taxation of income (for example, 
income is tax exempt both in the source and resident state) or double deduction of losses (for 
example, losses are deducted both in the source and resident state). This is a legitimate practice as 
long as it complies with the domestic tax laws and the respective tax treaties in place (Schneider et al. 
2014). 
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Germany is currently one of the countries spearheading the above-mentioned development. In the 
preamble of the German-MC, the German tax administration states that its intention is not only to 
eliminate double taxation, but also to prevent (double) non-taxation. Thus, it can be assumed that its 
future tax treaty policy will mainly target the following cases of double non-taxation (Schneider et al. 
2014): 
• The source state applies the tax treaty in any way whereby it feels restricted by the treaty not 
to tax the income while Germany grants as a residence state tax exemption under the tax 
treaty. 
• The relevant income is tax exempt both in the source and the residence state due to diverging 
domestic tax laws. 
The table below illustrates the OECD solutions in instances of non-double taxation:   
Instances of non-double taxation 
Due to: Application of 
differences in 
domestic laws 
Application of different 
provisions of the 
Convention due to 
differences in the 
domestic laws of the 
Contracting States 
Different 
interpretation of 
facts 
Different 
interpretation of DTT 
Provisions 
OECD 
Solution: 
Residence State 
must grant 
exemption 
notwithstanding the 
conflict of 
qualification (para 
32.3 of Comments 
on Article 23.A) 
Residence State must 
not grant exemption 
because source State 
‘may not tax in 
accordance with the 
provisions of the 
Convention’ (para 
32.7 on Article 23A) 
Article 23A(4): 
Residence State 
must not apply 
exemption (para 
32.6 on Article 
23A) 
Article 23A(4): 
Residence 
State must not apply 
exemption (para 32.6 
on Article 23A) 
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6. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIPS AND HYBRID 
ENTITIES 
6.1. Background 
The use of cross-border partnerships confronts consultants and clients with considerable taxing 
problems, due to the partnership’s heterogeneous treatment by different countries for civil law and tax 
law purposes. The same partnership may be treated as taxable entity in one country, but as fiscally 
transparent in the other country, where tax liability is instead conferred to the partners of the 
partnership. In a cross-border partnership structure these two basic tax concepts may clash together 
resulting in a conflict of qualification between the countries involved. As the countries are of a different 
view of who constitutes the taxpayer, the application of tax treaties gives rise to serious problems and 
may even result in double taxation not adequately avoided. 
A number of other difficulties arise where different rules of the tax treaty are applied by the contracting 
states to income derived by a partnership or its partners, depending on the domestic laws of these 
states or their interpretation of the provisions of the tax treaty or of the relevant facts. These difficulties 
relate to the broader issue of conflicts of qualification, which is dealt with in paragraphs 32.1 ff. and 
56.1 ff. of the Commentary (paragraphs 6 -7 of the OECD Commentary to Article 1). 
Due to these potential tax conflicts, partnerships became a focus of discussion among international 
academics and subject to countless legal writings, resulting in various approaches and principles in 
this respect. The tax treatment of partnerships has however never been dealt with as thoroughly as by 
the OECD in its Partnership Report released in 1999. 
Entities regarded as corporation are themselves liable and subject to tax. Entities classified as 
partnership are, however, usually seen as fiscally transparent. Instead its partners are considered 
liable and subject to tax. Therefore, if countries classify the same entity differently, as non-transparent 
in one country and as fiscally transparent in the other country, they are in conflict regarding the 
subject of taxation (Gummert et al. 2004). The same applies to entities, regarded in both countries as 
partnership but treated differently as non-transparent in one country and fiscally transparent in the 
other country (Gummert et al. 2004). 
6.2. The OECD report on partnerships 
The OECD report which the Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted, and decided to make available to 
the public on 20 January 1999, entitled “The Application of the OECD Model Convention to 
Partnerships” deals with the application of the provisions of the OECD MTC, and indirectly of bilateral 
tax conventions based on that Model, to partnerships.  
“The Partnership Report states in its examples 13 through 15, that a conflict of qualification between 
the source state and the state of residence can arise, if in the absence of a treaty definition for a 
treaty term both states apply differing domestic law to construe the term” stated Professor / Dr. Jürgen 
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Lüdicke at his public address at Seminar H of the IFA Congress 2008 in Brussels on topic:  Decision 
of German Federal Fiscal Court on Taxation of Interest Payments of a Partnership to a Partner.  
The Committee in paragraph 109 of the OECD Partnership Report has also indicated that: 
“in addressing conflicts of qualification problems faced by the State of residence, a 
useful point is the recognition of the principle that the domestic law of the State 
applying its tax governs all matters regarding how and in the hands of whom an 
item of income is taxed…When taxing an item of income, the source State 
therefore applies its domestic law, subject to the restrictions and limitations 
imposed on it by the provisions of its conventions. The way the State of residence 
qualifies an item of income for treaty purposes has no relevance on how and in the 
hands of whom the State of source taxes that item of income. The reverse, 
however, is not true. The way the State of residence eliminates double taxation will 
depend, to some extent, on how the Convention has been applied by the State of 
source...Thus the State of residence has a treaty obligation to apply the exemption 
or credit method vis-à-vis any item where a DTA authorises taxation of that income 
by the State of source.”  
Conflict of qualification can concern two main issues, the first one is qualification of partnerships and 
the other one is qualification of different types of hybrid financial instruments. When it concerns 
qualification for partnership, the main issue is how to treat a partnership for tax purpose when two 
contracting states classify the partnership differently because of domestic law. A partnership could be 
classified as either transparent or opaque for tax purpose. When two states classify a partnership, 
according to domestic law or different categories in the double tax convention, it could result in double 
non-taxation. 
Kleist (2012) raises the issue with subject identity in relation to hybrid arrangements. He states that 
for a double tax convention to be applicable and for it to provide a solution, the tax must be imposed 
on the same taxpayer. This means that in a conflict of qualification situation, it could be argued that 
tax is not imposed to the same taxpayer when one contracting state taxes the owner and the other 
contracting state taxes the entity. 
OECD has found that a number of difficulties relating to the application of tax treaties to partnerships 
fall in the broader category of conflicts of qualification, where the residence and source states apply 
different articles of the OECD MTC on the basis of differences in their domestic law (OECD 1999). 
One example below will describe a situation when double non-taxation can arise from qualification 
conflicts connected to partnerships: 
A partnership has its source state in state A. State A does not tax the income because it is state B, 
the resident state that has the right to tax according to the double tax convention. State B does not tax 
the income because of domestic law in state B, the partnership is classified as transparent for tax 
purpose in state B. 
OECD points out that a common difficulty is that some states treat partnerships as transparent entities 
and imposing no tax on the partnership itself but instead tax the owners of the partnership. Some 
other states treat partnership as a taxable entity which means that the partnership is taxed on its 
income as if it were a company (OECD 1999). Furthermore, OECD means that this type of conflict 
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could be solved under Article 23A(4) but that it requires that the tax treaty contains the exemption 
method.  
Another common situation which could result in double non-taxation is concerning hybrid financial 
instruments. OECD presented a report on the area in 2012 and in the report OECD split up different 
kinds of hybrid financial instrument and entities (OECD 2012). OECD has defined hybrid financial 
instruments as “instruments which are treated differently for tax purposes in the countries involved, 
most prominently as debt in one country and as equity in another country.” A hybrid financial 
instrument is designed to possess more than one legal form according to the contracting states 
domestic law. The hybrid financial instrument has become a mechanism for international tax planning 
and is used to take an advantage of the different legal framework in two or more States. Overall, 
hybrid mismatch arrangement raises a number of issues. The use of such instruments could distort 
competition, effect the economy and fairness in trade (Santos, 2013). 
The consequence of a hybrid financial instrument as defined as a mechanism for tax planning, could 
for example result in double deductions. With double deduction it is meant that the hybrid financial 
instrument created a deduction related to the same contractual obligation that is claimed for income 
tax purposes in two different countries. Double deductions could occur both from hybrid financial 
instruments and qualification conflicts of partnerships (Jones, 2002). 
6.3. Transparent partnership in one State 
A related problem arises in connection with whether income of a transparent partnership is treated as 
paid to a partner. If there is a difference between the two states in the categorization of the 
partnership as transparent or opaque, the OECD partnerships report suggests that the source state 
should “take into account, as part of the factual context in which the Convention is to be applied, the 
way in which an item of income arising in its jurisdiction is treated in the jurisdiction of the taxpayer 
claiming the benefits of the treaty as a resident.” This is the opposite approach from differences in 
categorization of income where the residence state follows the source state’s categorization. 
Thus, where the source state treats the partnership in the residence state as opaque and the 
residence state treats it as transparent, the source state should follow the residence state’s view and 
say that the income is paid to the partners rather than the partnership, thus giving effect to the object 
and purpose of the treaty. 
The same should apply in the reverse situation where the source state regards the residence state 
partnership as transparent and the residence state regards it as opaque: the source state should say 
that the income is paid to the partnership, rather than to the partners. However, this solution cannot 
apply if the partnership is also in the source state because the source state says that the partners are 
entitled to the income arising in that state, while the residence state says that the source state 
partnership is entitled to the income. The result is that the treaty is inapplicable. 
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Hugues Salome and Robert J. Danon in their article ‘The OECD Partnership Report – A Swiss View 
on Conflicts of Qualification’ quotes John Avery Jones as follows: 
“Implicitly, the OECD refers to the suggestions made by Avery Jones and his co-
authors contributions. According to these scholars, “the question of categorization 
of the income applies only to the source State and that State’s determination of the 
question of how the income is to be taxed is conclusive against the residence 
State, which must merely satisfy itself that the taxation by the source State is in 
accordance with the treaty. The state of residence should indeed take the answer 
to this question for granted and apply the Convention as it affects itself, by 
exempting or giving credit for the source State’s tax on the income which, may be 
taxed in the other Contracting State”. 
This principle applies in respect of tax suffered in the state of source by a different taxpayer to the 
taxpayer in the state of residence due to the conflict of qualification. Paragraph 69.2 of the OECD 
Commentary to Article 23 refers to an example where the State of source treats a partnership as an 
entity and levies tax thereon and the state of residence of a partner treats it as fiscally transparent and 
thus levies tax on such partner. The following is noted: 
‘the first issue that arises in this case is whether the State of residence, which 
taxes the partner on his share in the partnership’s income, is obliged, under the 
Convention, to give credit for the tax that is levied in the State of source on the 
partnership, which that latter State treats as a separate taxable entity. The answer 
to that question must be affirmative. To the extent that the State of residence 
flows-through the income of the partnership to the partner for the purpose of taxing 
him, it must adopt a coherent approach and flow-through to the partner the tax 
paid by the partnership for the purposes of eliminating double taxation arising from 
its taxation of the partner. In other words, if the corporate status given to the 
partnership by the State of source is ignored by the State of residence for 
purposes of taxing the partner on his share of the income, it should likewise be 
ignored for purposes of the foreign tax credit.’  
However, if as a result of different rules on the taxability or transparency of a company, particularly in 
the case of partnerships, a company is liable to tax in one of the contracting states, while its 
shareholders are treated as taxpayers in the other contracting state, the shareholders should be 
allowed, even in the absence of any special agreement, to obtain credit for their apportionate (sic) 
share of the tax paid by the company and vice versa (Vogel, 1996). 
Similarly, whether or not a particular entity is a hybrid entity depends on the domestic laws of the 
countries involved that classify the entities for tax purposes. The taxation of hybrid entities in cross-
border transactions has proved to be exceptionally complicated and is perhaps one of the most 
difficult issues in the application of rules on international tax law. 
Some countries, such as Germany, still treat a partnership as an independent entity in some ways. 
According to that approach, partnerships are utilized as accounting entity, i.e. the income is computed 
and reported at the partnership’s level where the corresponding accounting elections are applied. In 
this very respect the partnership is treated ‘as if it were a taxpayer’. The ascertained total profits of the 
partnership, however, are then to be allotted to the partners according to their respective share of 
these profits and are eventually taxed only at their level. Procedurally, this is carried out through 
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section 180 (1) No 2 (a) of the Internal Fiscal Code which ultimately results in a binding assessment 
of the partners` shares of the partnership`s profit (section 182 (1) of the Fiscal Code). 
Another issue to note is the potential dispute regarding which state is the source state and which state 
is the residence state. For example, if a partnership has partners in the other state and derives 
income in the other state and if the partnership is treated in the other state as a non-transparent 
entity, but as a transparent entity in the partnership state (i.e. in which the partnership has its seat). 
The partnership state would allocate the partnership’s income to the permanent establishment where 
the partnership has its seat. The partnership state would, therefore, regard itself as the source state. 
The other state, however, would regard the partnership state as the residence state since the 
partnership is, in the view of the other state, non-transparent and thus the taxpayer. The other state 
would, therefore, also regard itself as the source state. 
A dispute about which state acts as the source state and which state acts as the residence state 
cannot be resolved by an interpretation according to the lex fori (i.e. each state applies its tax treaties 
literally and according its own internal understanding) or the lex causae (according to the internal tax 
system of another state) or by an autonomous interpretation (i.e. according to a system established 
purely by the treaty itself and its provisions) (Gundisch 2005). 
6.4. Conclusion 
It should be noted that some countries have embarked on introducing provisions within their domestic 
law to deal with conflict of qualification in their cross-border transactions. For instance, the recently 
introduced section 50d paragraph 11 of the German Income Tax Act needs to be considered in terms 
of future payments. This provision was introduced to solve qualification conflicts arising from hybrid 
entities. Section 50d paragraph 11 provides that in the event of a conflict involving the classification of 
hybrid entities for tax purposes, the (formal) entitlement of a person to claim a refund of German 
withholding tax on the basis of a tax treaty shall be determined according to the applicable 
classification for tax purposes by the other contracting state. 
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7. INTERNATIONAL INCOME ATTRIBUTION CONFLICTS 
7.1. Background 
Special problems arise in interpreting treaty terms such as “enterprise”, “business” and “business 
profits” where those terms are also used in the domestic laws of contracting states, since this may 
give rise to a qualification conflict. Where both countries to a treaty interpret the meaning of 
“business” and “business profits” in light of different domestic laws, different distributive rules may be 
applied to the same income, leading to a qualification conflict (Jones et al. 2003).  
Most qualification conflicts in the interpreting the terms “enterprise”, “business” and “business profits” 
arise as a result of the different treatment of companies by civil and common law countries, since 
categorization of income is either made by reference to the nature of the income itself (the approach 
of common law countries, including the UK) or by reference to the taxpayer deriving the income (the 
approach of civil law countries). However, these differences in approach rarely lead to the application 
of different distributive rules because of the effect of two provisions in the OECD Model Convention (i) 
Article 7(7) which addresses the conflict that would otherwise arise from the broad definition of 
“business profits” and provides that to the extent that income is dealt with separately under another 
Article of the convention dealing with specific income categories, the provisions of that article should 
apply and (ii) the deeming provisions in Articles 10(4), 11(4), 12(3) and 13(2) which deem income or 
gains to be taxed in accordance with Article 7, to the extent that they are effectively connected with a 
PE in the source state. 
In practice, these provisions mean that common law countries will apply the relevant special article 
(i.e. Articles10,11 or 12) if they determine the activity is not a business activity, whereas civil law 
countries will start with Article 7, but Article 7(7) will then require the application of the other relevant 
distributive rule. 
The OECD MTC and its Commentaries have since 2000 update contained provisions dealing with 
“conflicts of qualification”, that is, different categorisation of income by the two states. These 
differences are particularly likely to arise in relation to whether income is categorised as business 
profits, certainly the most important type of income. The essence of the difference is that civil law 
countries treat all the income of a commercial company as business profits, so that the approach in 
the case of income earned by a commercial company is based on the type of person, while common 
law countries make the determination according to the type of income. The most obvious example of 
this difference in approach is that common law countries make a distinction between capital gains and 
business profits when taxing companies, civil law countries do not, since capital gains are part of 
business profits (Jones et al. 2003). 
7.2. Qualification of income: dividend 
A definition of the term “dividends” is provided in Article 10(3) of the OECD MTC. Nevertheless, in 
view of the great differences between various domestic laws, it is not possible to define the term 
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conclusively. Therefore, dividends are defined broadly and flexible through several examples, 
including income from shares and ‘jouissance’ rights. Moreover, reference is made to the domestic 
law of the source state in order to avoid qualification conflicts between contracting states (Hoor 2010).  
When a foreign company (source State) declares a dividend which falls into the definition of Article 
10(3) of the OECD MTC, it may then impose tax at the rate set out in Article 10(2). Resident state has 
unrestricted taxing rights in respect of such dividend, but is generally required in terms of Article 23 to 
provide a credit against the tax imposed by the source state on such dividend (Stiglingh et al. 2014).  
If a foreign company (source state) makes a distribution which, in terms of the domestic law of that 
jurisdiction, qualifies as a dividend, but which does not fall into the definition of a dividend in Article 
10(3) of the OECD MTC then the provisions of Article 7 (i.e. Business profits) of the OECD MTC 
should apply and the non-resident jurisdiction (i.e. source state) will generally not have any taxing 
rights in respect of the distribution unless the resident state shareholder operates through a 
permanent establishment in the source state and the dividend is attributable to such permanent 
establishment (Stiglingh et al. 2014). 
However, it should be noted that the dividend definition in Article 10(3) of the OECD MTC is wide and 
will cover most distributions on shares. For example, the source state may consider that a dividend is 
declared when the foreign company makes a distribution from its share premium account. In these 
circumstances, it is submitted that the source state would have the taxing rights set out in Article 
10(2). In these circumstances, resident state would not regard the distribution as a dividend as a 
matter of resident state domestic law and would tax the distribution in terms of its domestic law. It is 
submitted that the definition of ‘dividend’ in Article 10(3) of the OECD MTC does not require that the 
resident state must recognise the distribution as a dividend if such distribution does not constitute a 
dividend for purposes of the resident state domestic tax law. 
Vogel (1996) in his discussion of Article 10(3), states that the definition of ‘dividends’ is primarily of 
importance to the source state. He further states that it also affects taxation in the state of residence, 
since it determines, with binding effect on both states, whether or not certain items of income should, 
under treaty law, be considered to be dividends. Vogel states that this provision differs from Article 
3(2), which refers to the domestic law of the state applying the treaty in that it turns the relevant 
domestic law of the state of source into treaty law and, thus, leaves no scope for any different treaty 
application by the state of residence. 
7.3. Qualification of income: business profits 
Article 7(1) of the OECD MTC provides that business profits of an enterprise shall be taxable in the 
resident state unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state (i.e. source 
state) through a permanent establishment (PE) situated therein. 
A conflict can arise if the residence state considers that there is a PE in the other state but the other 
state does not. Suppose that a resident of the other state has a presence in the country concerned, 
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such as an office, then that would be a PE if that concept were relevant. If so, all the income attributed 
to it is business profits (Jones et al. 2003). 
The OECD commentary introduced provisions in the 2000 update to deal with this problem by giving 
priority to the source state’s categorization of the income. It is suggested that the question is solely 
one of “qualification” of the income, even though the existence or non-existence of a PE (or the 
connection of the income to the PE) is also involved, which might be a matter of treaty interpretation. 
The question whether there is a PE does not result from any disagreement about whether the 
definition of PE is met on the facts; rather, it follows from whether the income is treated as business 
profits in domestic law.  
7.4. OECD approach  
Despite the design of the OECD MTCl, there are circumstances in which source and residence states 
may nevertheless apply different distributive rules. However these situations are generally resolved by 
applying the ‘new’ OECD approach, which was introduced in the Commentary in 2000 (paragraph 32 
of the Commentary), and gives priority to the source state's categorization of the income. 
An example of the circumstances in which the application of different distributive rules may occur is 
where a company resident in a civil law residence state, manages a portfolio of shares through an 
office in the UK. Although the company is not carrying on a genuine business activity, the residence 
state is a civil law country and regards all income received by a company as business profits, 
whereas the UK, as source state looks at the type income earned by the company in order to decide 
whether it constitutes business profits. The residence state will apply Article 7 and then applies Article 
10, which then applies Article 7 via Article 10(4). This is because the residence state considers that 
the company is carrying on a business of asset management at the office in the source state, which is 
a PE for tax purposes. 
However for the UK there is no PE since it does not apply an “enterprise” fiction, and mere asset 
management does not constitute a business. Therefore Article 10 will apply and there will be no return 
to Article 7 via Article 10(4). 
The second example, is where the source state is a civil law country and considers all income earned 
by a company is business income and the UK, as the residence state treats all income according to 
its nature i.e. dividend income. In this case, the UK will apply Article 10 and the source state will apply 
Article 7. 
In both these cases where different distributive rules are applied, the new OECD approach will avoid 
double non-taxation (or low taxation) and double taxation. It is suggested that such a dispute is solely 
one of “qualification” of the income, even though the question whether there is a PE (or the 
connection of the income to the PE) is also involved, which might be taken to be dispute about the 
interpretation of the treaty. In the first case, whereas the residence state would normally exempt all 
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income attributable to the PE (assuming it is an exemption state), since the UK is not entitled to a full 
taxing right (it will be applying a reduced withholding tax under Article 10) the residence state will 
instead apply a credit. In the second example, since the source state is exerting a full taxing right, the 
UK will be obliged to grant exemption. The application of the OECD approach may lead to some 
countries manipulating their domestic law to ensure that either (i) the definition of “business” in their 
domestic law is as wide as possible to ensure that income constitutes business profits falling within 
Art.7, or (ii) where a tax treaty contains a provision equivalent to Art.21(3) of the UN Model (which 
allows the source country to tax without a PE), to ensure that income from certain sources (e.g. 
technical fees) does not constitute business profits under domestic law and therefore falls within the 
“other income” article. 
There may be circumstances in which the differing domestic laws of contracting states may lead to 
double taxation. This may occur where a bank receives interest on the only loan made to a resident of 
a particular state. Since there is only one loan, there will be no PE. The source state will treat the 
income as interest income resulting in a withholding tax being charged on the gross interest. 
However, if the residence state is a civil law country, it will treat the interest as business profits, and in 
the absence of a PE will assume full taxing rights over the income. However, the tax deducted in the 
source state may be too high to be fully credited against the residence country's tax on net profits 
(Jones et al. 2003). 
Paragraph 49 of the OECD Commentary to Article 23A states the following - 
“The combined effect of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 10 and Article 23 (Article 23 
A and 23 B as appropriate) is that the State of residence of the shareholder is 
allowed to tax dividends arising in the other State, but that it must credit against its 
own tax on such dividends the tax which has been collected by the State where 
the dividends arise at a rate fixed under paragraph 2 of Article 10. This regime 
equally applies when the recipient of the dividends is a parent company receiving 
dividends from a subsidiary; in this case, the tax withheld in the State of the 
subsidiary — and credited in the State of the parent company — is limited to 5 per 
cent of the gross amount of the dividends by the application of subparagraph a) of 
paragraph 2 of Article 10.” 
Through these provisions, the OECD attempts to effectively avoid the juridical double taxation of 
dividends but they do not prevent recurrent corporate taxation on the profits distributed to the parent 
company: first at the level of the subsidiary and again at the level of the parent company. Such 
recurrent taxation creates a very important obstacle to the development of international investment. 
Many states have recognised this and have inserted in their domestic law provisions designed to 
avoid this obstacle. Moreover, provisions to this end are frequently inserted in double taxation 
conventions (paragraph 50 of the Commentary). 
Paragraphs 56.1 – 56.2 of the OECD Commentary to Article 23A(4) provides a solution to a situation 
in which the source state charges only a withholding tax and the residence state exempts the income, 
in response to qualification conflict. The purpose of this paragraph is rather to avoid double non-
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taxation as a result of disagreements between the state of residence and the state of source on the 
facts of a case or on the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention.  
Paragraph 56.2 states the following - 
“The paragraph only applies to the extent that the State of source has applied the 
provisions of the Convention to exempt an item of income or capital or has applied 
the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 10 or 11 to an item of income. The 
paragraph would therefore not apply where the State of source considers that it 
may tax an item of income or capital in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention but where no tax is actually payable on such income or capital under 
the provisions of the domestic laws of the State of source. In such a case, the 
State of residence must exempt that item of income under the provisions of 
paragraph 1 because the exemption in the State of source does not result from the 
application of the provisions of the Convention but, rather, from the domestic law 
of the State of source (see paragraph 34 above). Similarly, where the source and 
residence States disagree not only with respect to the qualification of the income 
but also with respect to the amount of such income, paragraph 4 applies only to 
that part of the income that the State of source exempts from tax through the 
application of the Convention or to which that State applies paragraph 2 of Article 
10 or 11.” 
Paragraph 56.3 of the commentary on article 23 plays down the significance of the former (i.e. the 
situation in which the source state charges only a withholding tax) by saying that it is not needed 
where the exemption is caused by a difference in qualification of the income by domestic law, 
because this is covered by the latter (i.e. the residence state exempts the income, as explained by the 
commentary). 
7.5. Conclusion 
The OECD MTC permits the odd combination of a type-of-person approach in the residence state 
with a type-of-income approach in the source state (i.e. the existence of a PE depends on whether 
there is a business). This difference in approach is less important if the residence state follows the 
categorization by the source state in accordance with the Commentary and under new treaties that 
contain article 23A(4), which prevents exemption from applying. 
If the source state does not recognize the existence of a PE it normally makes no difference whether 
the income is categorized as business profits. Either one starts with article 7 and is sent to another 
article (or, if the other article is article 10, 11, or 12, one is not returned to article 7 because there is no 
PE), or one starts in the other article. This is likely to result in a withholding tax being charged even if 
both states accept that the income is business profits—for example, the bank that makes loans to 
residents of a state without having a PE there. Such a withholding tax may be too high in relation to 
the profit on the income to enable full credit to be obtained. One might expect business profits not to 
be charged to a withholding tax, but that is not the approach of the OECD model convention. 
It might be thought that the problem could be solved by defining “business profits” as well as 
“permanent establishment” in the treaty so that the two would tend to coincide from the point of view 
of the residence state. But if the treaty definition of business profits is wider than the internal law 
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definition, there is the problem that the taxation in the source state is by virtue of the narrower internal 
law, and thus the income still will not always be taxed as business profits.  
A better approach might be to ensure that Articles 10(4), 11(4), and 12(3) return one to Article 7 only if 
the income is in fact subject to tax as profits attributable to the PE. If the income were not subject to 
tax as business profits, it would remain in article 10, 11, or 12, with the result that the residence state 
would not exempt the income but would give credit for the withholding tax. 
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8. INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW 
8.1. Background 
Tax treaty disputes are also frequently solved through recourse to domestic courts. This is a rather 
unusual process in the universe of treaties, which are instruments between states. This difference 
between tax treaties and other treaties can be explained by the fact that tax treaties involve a third 
party that is absent during the negotiating process, namely the taxpayer, and the conflicting interests 
of the taxpayer and the states allow the adversarial process to work relatively well, even when the 
issue must be decided by a court of one of the contracting states. 
Below I summarise the existing case law in various jurisdictions, discussing how the courts have 
attempted to resolve the conflicts of qualification.  
8.2. Australia 
In Ostime (HM Inspector of Taxes) v. Australian Mutual Provident Society (1958) 38 TC 492, the 
House of Lords held that where there was a clear conflict between the provisions of the Double 
Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Australia) Order, 1947 and domestic law, the treaty provisions 
overrode domestic law (Baistrocchi et al. 2012) such that a notional sum of investment income based 
on a deemed proportion of income from investment of a life assurance fund, constituted “industrial or 
commercial profits” for the purposes of the Australian treaty. Therefore, the attribution rules in that 
treaty applied and the House of Lords rejected the Crown’s contention that “industrial or commercial 
profits” only referred to trading profit. Lord Denning dissented on the basis that the treaty made a 
distinction between business profits and investment income and under UK domestic tax principles, a 
mutual assurance company would be making investment, rather than trading income. 
8.3. Canada 
In Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Pearson [1986] BTC 282, the Court of Appeal found 
that “profits” for the purposes of the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Canada) Order 1967 
referred to a Canadian enterprise’s investment income, not its income less expenses. The Court held 
that while the term “profits” commonly referred to “receipts less expenses”, that interpretation was by 
no means easily applicable to all businesses and that a wider interpretation of “profits” may be 
required.  
8.4. United Kingdom (UK) 
In General Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Tomlinson, H.M. Inspector of Taxes, the High Court held that 
enhanced values obtained from sale or conversion of securities from underwriting activities which 
arose on capital account, may be charged as trading profits of the London branch, where what was 
done was not merely a realization or change of investment, but an act done in what was the carrying 
on or carrying out of a business (see also Northern Assurance Co v. Russell). 
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Meanwhile, the Padmore v. IRC case is an example of a conflict between the provisions of a treaty 
and UK domestic law, which was not accepted by the UK. In response, UK Parliament enacted 
legislation (Section 58 of the Finance Act 2008) with retrospective effect to intentionally override the 
effect of Article 7 and ensure that business profits attributable to a person resident in the UK were 
nevertheless chargeable to tax. The legality of the retrospective effect of this legislation has recently 
been challenged unsuccessfully under the Human Rights Act 2008 in Huitson v. HMRC [2010] EWHC 
97 (Admin). 
8.5. Germany 
German Federal Fiscal Court rules on qualification of income derived from an US LLC for purposes of 
the double tax treaty between Germany and the United States. On August 20, 2008, the German 
Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof) pronounced on the qualification of income for purposes of the 
double tax treaty between Germany and the United States derived by a German resident individual 
from a limited liability company (LLC) established under the laws of Florida. This judgement is 
summarised as follows: 
• In order to determine the tax nature (and time of taxation) of income which German resident 
shareholders/partners derive from foreign entities, it has to be determined whether the 
distributing entity is treated as a corporation or partnership for German tax purposes.  
• Under an applicable double taxation treaty, distributions from foreign corporations are 
generally taxable in Germany under Article 10 (Dividends) of the applicable treaty, while 
business profits attributable to a permanent establishment from partnerships are regularly 
exempt from German taxation under Article 7 (Business Income) of the applicable treaty. 
• The German Federal Fiscal Court confirmed that the qualification of an LLC either as a 
corporate body or a transparent entity (i.e., a partnership) depends on a case by case 
analysis of the applicable US federal and state company law provisions which regulate the 
LLC in question and the concrete structural features of the LLC that the shareholders agreed 
upon.  
• This “autonomous” German qualification approach may cause double taxation conflicts where 
an LLC is treated as a transparent entity for US federal income tax purposes, while Germany 
assumes predominating corporate features and thus treats the entity as a corporation for 
German tax purposes. In such case, the US would tax the profits of the (non-US-resident) 
LLC members at partner level (and, in case of business profits attributable to a permanent 
establishment in the United States, claim a corresponding taxation right under Article 7 of the 
Treaty), while Germany would tax the same profits – upon distribution to the members – as a 
dividend and would also claim a taxation right under Article 21 (Other Income) of the Treaty.  
• Because Germany claims the sole taxation right under Article 21 of the Treaty, there is a risk 
that Germany would regularly not grant any tax credit for US taxes paid by the members on 
income allocated to them on the level of the LLC. 
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8.6. Netherlands 
From 1997 the Netherlands introduced an exit charge in its income tax law for substantial 
shareholdings in Netherlands resident companies, in the case of the shareholder’s emigration. The 
amount of tax due is computed on the basis of the value of the unrealized capital gain during the 
period of Netherlands residence of the shareholder. The tax charge is made at the time immediately 
preceding emigration; the collection of tax, however, is postponed until the gain is actually realized by 
the later alienation of the shares. Collection is no longer pursued after a period of 10 years following 
emigration has expired.  
The taxpayer held 100% shareholding in a company, tax resident in the Netherlands. Upon his 
emigration from the Netherlands the taxpayer was faced with an income tax charge for the capital 
appreciation during his period of Netherlands residence, in accordance with the exit taxation of 
substantial shareholdings. The taxpayer contested the charge, arguing that it was in conflict with the 
applicable provisions on capital gains in the three tax treaties between the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and the United States, respectively, all of which were concluded before the 
introduction of the Netherlands exit tax.  
The Supreme Court decided in all three cases that the provisions of the tax treaties concerned did not 
prevent the Netherlands exit tax from being levied. It first held that the taxpayer could not, in principle, 
rely on a tax treaty, since the taxable gain under Netherlands domestic law was deemed to have been 
derived before his emigration at a time when no treaty was applicable. The Court went on to hold that 
the exit tax might nevertheless be in conflict with the good faith to be observed in the interpretation 
and application of tax treaties under Article 31(1) of the VCLT, if a gain were to be taxed that in fact 
was allocated by a tax treaty to another state. Since the provisions on capital gains in the tax treaties 
concerned were all modelled on the OECD MTC, the Supreme Court took the OECD Commentaries 
into consideration for their intended meaning. The Court deduced from paragraphs 2-9, 12 and 29 of 
the OECD Commentary on Article 13 that the reference to ‘gains’ in Article 13(4) would not preclude a 
state from deeming as taxable income capital appreciation that is not realized by alienation. In the 
Court’s opinion the Netherlands exit tax was aimed at no more than taxing the increase in the value of 
the shares during the period of Netherlands residence of a shareholder, as could be seen, among 
other things, from the step-up allowed upon immigration to the Netherlands. Therefore, this tax did not 
breach the required good faith.  
The Court did not consider the deemed nature of the gain as conflicting with the tax treaties’ intent, 
unlike in previous decisions on such other deemed items of income as notional salary (Supreme 
Court, 25 September 2003, No. 37.651) and notional interest (Supreme Court, 18 June 2004, No. 
39.385) as determined in preceding judgements. This could be because OECD Commentaries 
providing clarifications on such other types of deemed income are lacking as well.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions may result in unrelieved double taxation if, when taxing the gain upon 
its realization by a later alienation, a contracting state does not allow a reduction of the taxable basis 
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by the amount previously taxed in the Netherlands (a step-up). Admittedly, the OECD Commentaries 
point out several cases of double taxation that remains untouched by Article 13. But the present case 
of unrealized gains is not included. This means that it remains unclear whether such double taxation 
results from a deficiency in Article 13 or from a wrong interpretation by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court referred to the step-up that is allowed under Netherlands domestic law, but, in all 
honesty, this cannot serve as a justification since the OECD Model leaves other states free to 
compute a gain according to their domestic law and therefore are not obliged to adopt the 
Netherlands example.  
8.7. Belgium 
Belgian case law has been consist in upholding that tax treaties should be interpreted in such a way 
as to avoid double non-taxation. In case of a conflict of qualification between the source state and the 
state of residence, Belgian courts will rather stick to the qualification provided by Belgian law, even if 
this leads to double non-taxation. The Belgian tax revenue author also hold the view that in such 
cases (of conflict of qualifications), Belgium should apply its own domestic qualifications (Morbee 
2004). 
The judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeal of 24 September 1998 is a striking example hereof. 
The court ruled that if it is not shown that the context requires otherwise, the Belgian authorities may 
not apply any foreign provisions, nor qualifications resulting therefrom, in order to conclude that 
Belgium has the right to tax on the basis of the tax treaty even if this leads to double non-taxation 
(Morbee 2004). 
On retirement, a Belgian resident received French sourced employment benefits from a French 
employer, as well as from French social security organisation (Assédic). In terms of the French 
domestic law, the income received qualified as a pension. France therefore concluded that only 
Belgium (as state of residence) had the right to tax. The taxpayer claimed that Belgium also had to 
exempt the income in accordance with Belgian domestic law as this kind of income qualifies as salary, 
which according to the tax treaty is only taxable in the state in which the activity was exercised i.e. 
France which is the source state. The Court agreed with the taxpayer. The Court also ruled that the 
interpretation rule provided for in article 22 of the France / Belgium tax treaty (comparable with Article 
3(2) of the OECD MTC) might lead to double non-taxation (Morbee 2004). 
Although this judgment dates back before the update of the OECD commentary and in spite of the 
fact that the France / Belgium tax treaty does not follow the OECD model, it shows that the new 
approach to article 23 is not (yet) supported by Belgian courts. By the way, the Court does not take 
the OECD recommendation into account either, according to which any interpretation avoiding double 
taxation or double non-taxation is more desirable than one leading to double taxation or double 
exemption. Some scholars criticised the judgment for this reason (Morbee 2004). 
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8.8. Conclusion 
The fundamental issue is how the contracting states interpret and apply the tax treaty. Special 
problems arise in interpreting treaty terms, where those terms are also used in the domestic laws of 
Contracting States, since this may give rise to conflicts of qualification. This also poses problems for 
courts on how to interpret and apply treaties properly and consistently. 
Another reason why domestic rules of interpretation cannot be solely relied on, is that domestic rules 
of interpretation of statutes differ from state to state. In civil law countries, only some courts take a 
literal view towards statutory interpretation. In common law countries like Australia, India, New 
Zealand, UK, most courts take a literal approach, which is that each word is given its normal meaning 
without taking notice of any intrinsic material. The literal approach is based on the view that the role of 
the courts is not to make legislation (including rectifying defects) but merely to interpret legislation. 
However, more recently, courts in common law countries as well as in South Africa have also applied 
a so-called ‘purposive approach’ (Honiball & Olivier 2011). 
According to Vogel (1996), the mandate to interpret a tax treaty in the light of its object and purposes, 
leads to the request that states should seek the interpretation of the treaty which is most likely to be 
accepted in both contracting states, referred to as the ‘rule of common interpretation’. Consequently, 
according to Vogel, the courts of the one contracting state are obliged to take into consideration and 
evaluate the merits of relevant decisions of courts in the other Contracting State (Vogel (1996) 
Introduction 74 39).  
In terms of this rule, the foreign court decisions of the other contracting state must therefore have 
greater value than merely being of persuasive value to a South African court. This interpretation rule 
is therefore clearly one of the interpretation rules which is peculiar to tax treaty (as opposed to 
domestic statutory) interpretation. However, the rule of common interpretation does not mean that the 
court decisions of the other contracting state must be accepted uncritically, without review (Honiball & 
Olivier 2011). 
Neither the administration bodies nor the courts of one country are bound by the administrative or 
judicial decisions of the other state. Conflicts in the application of the double tax convention will 
therefore always be possible, which can easily lead to non-intended double taxation as well as double 
non-taxation (Groen 2002).    
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9. CONCLUSION 
The above obviously raises questions with regard to the resolution of conflicts of qualification. Tax 
treaties do not usually provide a clear way to resolve a “conflict of qualification” problem. As 
demonstrated, OECD MTC solutions to qualification conflicts lies primarily in three areas, namely –  
• Article 3(2) rule on treaty interpretation; 
• Article 23 and its commentary which dictates that resident state must provide relief; and 
• Article 25 and commentary which deals with mutual agreement procedures in the event of 
conflict.  
Firstly, what renders OECD Commentaries such important status, in the interpretation of treaties? 
Understandably, the Model itself and the commentaries are the work of the respective committees of 
the OECD, which comprise of senior government officials drawn from their respective member 
countries in consultation with business and other international and regional tax organisations (Gulati 
2013), but surely countries will differ in their approach and expectations. Furthermore, the 
commentaries only set out the informed intentions of the OECD while formulating the articles of their 
model.  
I have highlighted in this study the OECD emphasis on Article 3(2) as a relief for conflicts of 
qualification. The respected Professor Lang (2001) holds a view that it is rather artificial to resolve 
qualification problems by interpreting the term application of the Article 3(2) narrowly, leading to 
source state approach. He argues that there are actually no other arguments supporting this kind of 
interpretation than the need for a common interpretation. Because the object of common 
interpretation is not necessarily the object of Article 3(2) the article should not be interpreted to oblige 
the state of residence to accept the source state interpretation without asking questions. The OECD 
MTC rather accepts that different interpretations may be reached and therefore Article 25 concerning 
mutual agreement procedure is included in the Model. 
Secondly, double tax treaties are international agreements imposing obligations upon the treaty 
partner states. Only those states may require the other state to refrain from taxation, to grant a tax 
credit, or to avoid tax discriminations. It is up to the states to meet the international obligations: they 
may change their domestic tax laws or give direct effect to the convention in their internal law sphere 
(Vogel 1996). The effectiveness of Article 23 and its commentary is therefore further questioned.   
Each country may also have a general interest in the treaty partner respecting the terms of the 
treaties negotiated to protect its own economy abroad and to attract the inflow of foreign capital. 
Binding treaty qualification for the residence state would neither solve the problems nor be a 
requirement derived from the Model Treaty. Under article 23 of the OECD MC, the residence state is 
only bound to eliminate double taxation when, according to the treaty, the source state is enable to 
exercise its tax jurisdiction, giving relief according to the terms of that article (paragraph 32.1 of the 
Commentary on Article 23). However, application of article 23 does not necessarily imply that in order 
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to eliminate double taxation the residence state has to mandatorily follow the income treaty 
classification given by the other contracting state (Prats 2011). 
Thirdly, the usefulness of the mutual agreement procedure has been questioned by Runge (2002) as 
follows: 
“…it generally takes a long time and it is the tax authorities that control the 
procedure; the taxpayer enjoys no particular legal protection. The taxpayer has 
neither the right to demand a mutual agreement procedure nor to demand the 
elimination of taxation contravention principles. The taxpayer has no right to be 
heard or to otherwise involved, and has nor right to be informed of the decision 
itself or the grounds on which it was taken. Moreover, there is no obligation to 
disclose the agreement. The absence of the mandatory problem resolution is the 
largest disadvantage of the procedure.” 
The main problem with the mutual agreement procedure is that it is not a binding process. For years, 
academics have suggested arbitration as a means to resolve disputes arising under tax treaties. 
Below I suggest potential solutions to aid in resolving and / or eradicating conflicts of qualification 
conflicts between contracting states. 
9.1. Amendments to domestic law 
In relation the question of which contracting state’s domestic law should be applied (i.e. the source or 
resident state), Vogel (2003) has stated there are three possibilities (i) both states applying the treaty 
qualify the terms according to the requirements of their own domestic law (ii) both states qualify treaty 
terms consistently according to the law of the state in which income arises i.e. the source state or (iii) 
both states seek to establish a consistent qualification from the context of the treaty i.e. an 
autonomous qualification. Assuming an autonomous interpretation of the treaty term in option (iii) is 
not possible, and the application of both state’s domestic laws in option (i) results in conflict, the 
general view is that the law of the state of source should prevail. The residence state may also apply 
its interpretation. However given the OECD approach, this has not been considered further. 
To the extent the contracting states cannot agree on an autonomous meaning of a term from the 
context of the treaty because the autonomous contextual meaning is unclear, it will be necessary to 
ascertain the meaning of the term by reference to each contracting states’ domestic tax laws and 
compare the domestic tax law meanings with the contextual treaty meaning, to the extent one can be 
derived, to see whether the context otherwise requires. If there is still a qualification conflict caused by 
the differing application of each state’s domestic laws, the source state qualification should prevail. 
In Germany, for instance, under the prevailing interpretation of Article 59 of the Grundgesetz, duly 
ratified treaties are part of German law and enjoy same status as federal statutes. German courts are 
bound to interpret domestic law, as far as possible, in a way that avoids the breach of international 
legal obligations. The role of German courts in the domestic implementation of international treaties 
appears to be considerable but straightforward: their task is to allow Germany to fulfil its international 
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obligations by faithfully interpreting German law in accordance with Germany’s international 
obligations, in particular treaty obligations (Sloss 2009).   
It must not be overlooked that the approach already taken by the 2000 Update, which has been 
confirmed and developed further by the OECD 2008 Update, tries to cure a disease caused by other 
positions of the OECD Commentary: The OECD has neither abolished the reference to domestic law 
in Article 3 (2) of the OECD Model nor has made it clear that the phrase “unless the context otherwise 
requires” should be understood as broadly as possible. The fewer the cases that occur where 
domestic law is used to interpret tax treaty terms, the greater is the probability that both states will try 
hard to interpret the treaty in its context, and thereby reach an understanding of a treaty term that can 
be accepted in common. This would be best to avoid both double taxation and double non-taxation. 
Of course, it may be burdensome to focus not only on definitions but to achieve interpretation results 
by taking into account the wording and the history of a provision, its context and its object and 
purpose. However, making use of the traditional means of interpretation is common to us lawyers 
whenever we interpret terms of domestic law, which are quite often undefined as well. It is not 
convincing to forget all our methodology when it comes to the interpretation of tax treaty provisions 
(Lang 2009). 
9.2. Renegotiation of tax treaties  
Tax treaties often take years to conclude or to amend. Frequently, a request to fix a minor issue 
through a protocol leads to a full reconsideration of the whole treaty, which sometimes discourages 
states from even trying to amend the treaty. This has sometimes led to accusations that tax 
authorities were attempting to amend their treaties through changes to the commentary because they 
could not quickly negotiate protocols to their existing treaties. It has also led some countries to enact 
legislative changes that modify the legal effect of tax treaties under their law (Arnold et al. 2003). 
The following should be considered in renegotiating the treaties to avert qualification conflicts:  
• Potential remedies to reduce the period of time needed for the conclusion of a treaty 
renegotiation. 
• Ways through which amendments to treaties could be adopted quickly, for example, a regular 
or multilateral amendment process. 
• The competent authorities (i.e. expression normally used by OECD to refer to country’s 
revenue authorities) should be given some latitude to adapt tax treaties to changing 
circumstances, potentially through domestic law changes. 
On average, tax treaties of OECD countries remain unchanged for 15 years after they are signed or 
after a protocol is concluded. Compared to domestic law, which is modified almost every year, tax 
treaties therefore appear immutable. While this guarantees a certain degree of tax stability for 
taxpayers, it reduces the capacity of a country to adapt its tax treaty network to changing 
circumstances, including important domestic tax policy changes (Arnold et al. 2003). 
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9.3. Enhancing the Status of the Commentary 
As stated above, in most OECD countries, the commentary is regularly used by courts for the 
purposes of interpreting tax conventions. 
The conclusions drawn by the late Justice Graham Hill “from the point of view of a judge of a common 
law system” can thus be shared by authors coming from a civil law background “I would afford the 
same status to the commentary on a provision in a model convention as I would to the opinion of 
textbook writers. Both are informative, but neither is binding. But it would seem a difficult matter, 
absent any consensus of the contracting states, to regard a commentary after ratification in the same 
way as a commentary before, if only because the changed commentary was not taken into account by 
the parties to the treaty before adopting the particular provision” (Lang 2008). 
The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) brings together the tax policy and tax administration 
expertise of its participating countries (both OECD and non-OECD) allowing its Working parties and 
Forums to focus on both the evolution of tax policy and on good practice in all the key areas of tax 
administration. This has proved to be valuable as it is increasingly seen as important to consider the 
practical administrative implications of new tax laws and policies as these are being developed. 
According to paragraph 29 of the Introduction to OECD MTC, the Commentaries have been drafted 
and agreed upon by the experts appointed to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs by the Governments of 
member countries; they are of special importance in the development of international fiscal law. 
Although the Commentaries are not designed to be annexed in any manner to the conventions signed 
by member countries, which unlike the Model are legally binding international instruments, they can 
nevertheless be of great assistance in the application and interpretation of the conventions and, in 
particular, in the settlement of any disputes. 
Paragraph 29.3 states “Bilateral tax treaties are receiving more and more judicial attention as well. 
The courts are increasingly using the Commentaries in reaching their decisions. Information collected 
by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs shows that the Commentaries have been cited in the published 
decisions of the courts of the great majority of member countries. In many decisions, the 
Commentaries have been extensively quoted and analysed, and have frequently played a key role in 
the judge’s deliberations. The Committee expects this trend to continue as the worldwide network of 
tax treaties continues to grow and as the Commentaries gain even more widespread acceptance as 
an important interpretative reference”. 
It is therefore essential to that the OECD Commentary be improved and enhanced to decisively deal 
with conflicts of qualification. This will enhance the value of the Commentary as a tool for treaty 
interpretation by countries, courts, as well as mere taxpayers. 
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In my view, a dynamic reference can be justified only if the respective modification of the Commentary 
has a clarification purpose. However, if there are significant changes to the meaning of the Articles of 
the OECD MTC or the Commentary, the amendments does not seem reasonable.  
9.4. Bilateral Advance Rulings for Tax Treaty Issues 
According to EY Guide to advance pricing agreements (APA) (2014), The Advance Pricing 
Agreement (APA) program allows the taxpayer and the tax authority to avoid future transfer pricing 
disputes by entering into a prospective agreement, generally covering at least five tax years, 
regarding the taxpayer’s transfer prices. Taxpayers may enter into APAs with more than one tax 
authority – i.e., bilateral or multilateral APAs - through the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) 
included in most income tax treaties. 
Bilateral advance pricing agreements (APAs) may be seen as a form of bilateral advance rulings 
dealing with one treaty issue—that is, transfer pricing. One could envisage extending the APA 
process to cover all treaty issues. Such extension would constitute a process of pre-dispute 
settlement of treaty issues. 
A number of countries recommend concluding advance pricing agreements with the relevant tax 
authorities to avoid double taxation from a conflict of qualification. In particular, this is possible in The 
Netherlands, the US, Germany, Switzerland and Korea. On the other hand, APA are explicitly 
disallowed in Spain, the UK and Taiwan (Athanas 2000). 
9.5. Dispute Resolution 
The mutual agreement procedure (MAP) provided for in Article 25 of MTC will often be used to agree 
upon a common definition of a term. Generally, the rule is that the term be given the meaning which it 
has in the domestic tax law of the countries. 
The Member States of the European Community have decided through their multilateral Arbitration 
Convention (signed on 23 July 1990) that certain cases of double taxation which cannot be solved 
through the mutual agreement procedure should be submitted for international arbitration (Schwarz 
2009).  
The OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs formed a working group to examine ways of improving the 
effectiveness of the mutual agreement procedure (MAP), including the consideration of other dispute 
techniques which might be used to supplement the operation of the MAP. In 2007 a final report, 
‘Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes’ was approved by OECD’s Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs. This final report includes the following four recommendations (OECD 2007): 
• A supplementary dispute resolution mechanism in the form of a mandatory binding arbitration 
resolution in addition to the OECD MAP considerations; 
• Changes in the Commentary of the MAP provision aimed at clarifying and improving various 
operational and substantial aspects of the MAP process; 
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• A Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Procedure (MEMAP) as an online resource to 
explain the MAP process and to describe ‘best practices to effective MAP’; and 
• Annual reporting by the OECD Member countries of key statistics regarding their MAP case 
load.  
Article 25(5) provides for mandatory arbitration of all issues unresolved under the MAP after two 
years. The purpose of Article 25(5) is not to replace the MAP with an independent evaluation of the 
case by a body of arbitrators, but to supplement the procedure in the cases where the competent 
authorities are unable to agree on the appropriate interpretation and application of a treaty, Once the 
outstanding issues had been settled by the arbitration, the competent authorities will be in a position 
to settle the case (Honiball et al. 2011).  
Tax authorities, however, frequently reply that the lack of a binding process for solving tax treaty 
disputes does not matter in practice, as evidenced by the fact that almost all mutual agreement cases 
between OECD countries are resolved by the competent authorities. They have also argued that the 
widespread use of arbitration would hamper the mutual agreement procedure since it would lead the 
competent authorities to refuse to compromise in order to solve disputes at the level of the mutual 
agreement procedure (Arnold et al. 2003). 
The following should be noted in improving the MAP, as well as in dispute resolution mechanisms in 
cases of qualification conflicts:  
• A question of whether the arbitration process should become a feature of tax treaties. Simply 
put, should contracting States consider an inclusion of provisions dealing with arbitration 
process in the negotiation of tax treaties? If yes, what should be the characteristics of a tax 
treaty arbitration process? 
9.6. International Court of Justice (ICJ)  
Under Article 36(1) of the Statute, the ICJ can decide on a matter presented to it by mutual agreement 
of disputing states. This agreement confers jurisdiction of the ICJ for the specific case. The 
agreement may even be agreed upon implicitly, when a state accepts appearance before the Court 
without protest. It is thus currently already possible for tax treaty disputes to be submitted to the ICJ if 
contracting states involved agree to do so (Zuger 2002). 
Under Articles 36(1) and (2), Disputes regarding the interpretation or application of a tax treaty may 
therefore be unilaterally brought before the ICJ. However, the declaration accepting the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction may be issued with limitations. States are thus allowed to unilaterally exclude certain 
topics from the Court’s jurisdiction. Such a limitation is valid with regard to all other states. At present, 
none of the declarations exclude tax treaty matters (Zuger 2002).  
9.7. Interpretation of treaty terms 
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It is generally accepted that the OECD Model Commentary has a significant impact on treaty 
interpretation. However, there are different views regarding the question of which version of the 
OECD Model Commentary should be used for treaty interpretation purposes (Schneider et al. 2014). 
A difficulty about Article 3(2) has been that some states do not give relief for tax charged by the 
source state based on its internal law meaning of a term, when the residence state, by applying its 
law, does not categorize the income as a category that the source state may tax. This view is taken 
by some exemption states that, as residence states, categorize income to determine whether 
exemption or credit is to be given; it is not a problem for tax credit states that give credit for all types 
of income. On this interpretation, Article 3(2) causes the failure to give relief.  
The commentary now states that this is not the correct approach. The source state applies its internal 
law to determine whether the treaty permits it to tax; the residence state gives relief if on this basis the 
source state is permitted to tax without asking whether it agrees with the source state’s interpretation. 
The argument in favour of the commentary’s interpretation is that Article 23 does not contain any 
undefined terms in respect of which Article 3(2) might require reference to internal law. All that it says 
is that credit or exemption is to be allowed where a resident “derives income . . . which, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed in the other Contracting State.” 
The OECD Commentary suggests that existing conventions should, as far as possible, be interpreted 
in the spirit of the revised Commentaries. Member countries wishing to clarify their positions in this 
respect could do so by means of an exchange of letters between competent authorities in accordance 
with the mutual agreement procedure and even in the absence of such an exchange of letters, these 
authorities could use mutual agreement procedures to confirm this interpretation in particular cases. 
Apparently, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs assumes that the interpretative value of later 
Commentary versions can be increased through mutual agreement under Article 25 (3) OECD Model 
Convention. 
According to Article 25 (3) first sentence OECD Model Convention, “the competent authorities of the 
contracting states shall endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as 
to the interpretation or application of the Convention”. Such an agreement reached under Article 25 
(3) first sentence OECD Model Convention is regarded as a treaty under international law and may 
thus fall under Article 31 (3) (a) VCLT as a “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”.  
9.8. Subject-to-tax clause 
As already mentioned above, double non-taxation may also occur if the income is tax exempt both in 
the source and the residence state due to diverging domestic tax laws. Such double non-taxation can 
be avoided through inclusion of subject-tax-clauses. This was recommended by the EU Commission 
recommendation of 6 December 2012, on Aggressive Tax Planning. Under a subject-to-tax clause a 
state is only obliged to grant tax treaty benefits if the income is subject to tax in the other contracting 
state (Schneider et al. 2014). 
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9.9. Unilateral interpretative declaration  
In accordance with paragraph 30 of the Introduction to the OECD MTC, each OECD Member States 
has the right to make an observation if they do not agree with an interpretation prescribed by the 
Commentary. It can be argued that such an observation may be considered a unilateral interpretative 
declaration by the state making the observation, reflecting its position at the time a bilateral tax treaty 
was concluded. The observations ‘usually indicate the way in which those countries will apply the 
provisions of the Article in question’. In this way, a state does not, by definition, rule out a different 
interpretation. 
The Netherlands has made the following observation to the OECD Commentary regarding 
qualification conflicts (see paragraph 80 to the Commentary): 
“The Netherlands in principle is in favour of solving situations of both double 
taxation and double non-taxation due to conflicts of qualification between 
Contracting States, since in the Netherlands view such situations are not intended 
by the Contracting States and moreover go against the object and purpose of a tax 
treaty. However, the Netherlands does not agree with the interpretation given in 
paragraphs 32.4 and 32.6 to the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention” in Articles 23 A and 23 B of the Convention that in cases of conflicts 
of qualification that are due to differences in domestic law between the State of 
source and the State of residence as a rule the qualification given by the State of 
source would prevail for purposes of the application by the State of residence of 
Article 23 A or 23 B. 
The Netherlands wishes to preserve its right to subject a solution and its 
modalities for a certain conflict of qualification to the circumstances of the cases at 
hand and to the relationship with the Contracting State concerned. The 
Netherlands therefore will adhere to said interpretation in paragraphs 32.4 and 
32.6 only, and to the extent which, it is explicitly so confirmed in a specific tax 
treaty, as a result of mutual agreement between competent authorities as meant in 
Article 25 of the Convention or as unilateral policy.” 
Likewise, Switzerland has made the following observation to the OECD Commentary regarding 
qualification conflicts (see paragraph 81 to the Commentary): 
“Switzerland reserves its right not to apply the rules laid down in paragraph 32 in cases where a 
conflict of qualification results from a modification to the internal law of the State of source subsequent 
to the conclusion of a Convention.” 
9.10. Overall conclusion 
This study has highlighted the different views of many scholars and respected academics on relief of 
qualification conflicts, as well as some of the judicial decisions on such conflicts. As demonstrated 
there is no ‘fit all’ solution as cases will vary. Qualification conflicts will always arise as they are 
unplanned, it will take some concrete resolutions between the contacting states, particularly the 
competent authorities, to craft and improve tax treaties in a manner and spirit of the object of the 
treaty. The proposed solutions above could only help to anticipate some potential areas of conflicts. 
These could be included in the drafting and interpretations of treaties.     
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It is noted that no reference is made in Article 23 of the OECD MTC to any domestic legislation in 
terms of treaty interpretation. The qualification mentioned by this provision is not made by the state of 
source but by the treaty rules agreed upon by both contracting states (Lang 2001). Therefore, 
whether according to these settlements (which are binding for the two parties), the state of source is 
entitled to tax income of a resident of the other contracting state, both states must provide in their 
internal tax law some methods to avoid an international double taxation situation. The aim of the 
reference to domestic law is to oblige states to prevent their residents from double taxation that will 
probably derive from situations in which, as both parties agreed, the right to tax corresponds to the 
state of source although the person liable to be taxed is not a resident of this state.  
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